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The reason acts slowly, with so many 
examinations and on so many principles, 
which must be always present, that at every 
hour it falls asleep, or wanders, through want 
of having all its principles present. 
Feeling does not act thus; it acts in a 
moment, and is always ready to act. 
We must then put our faith in feeling; 
otherwise it will be always vacillating. 
(Blaise Pascal, 1660) 
1. Introduction 
Words of the so called last medieval and first modern thinker Blaise 
Pascal. With his thoughts (pensées) its genius was not only the 
coequal antipode to Descartes but beyond it’s time in many respects. 
Not only mathematics today can be said to be still influenced by his 
ideas. It is quite obvious that he had a need for applying them by 
solving practical problems: among countless other works he invented 
a mechanical calculator for basic arithmetic operations (starting with 
it as a teen to help his father doing his business), founded the first 
public bus system in Paris and invented the roulette table as we 
know it today. The latter invention has to be noted in connection with 
his overwhelming interest in betting and lotteries. His studies of 
probability were carried out by extensively watching his rich friends 
betting their money in all kinds of games. 
 Maybe for that reason Pascal was the first who argued that an 
informed bettor could choose the option which provided the largest 
combination of value and probability of the outcomes. The product of 
both quantities today is known as ‘expected value’. Later Daniel 
Bernoulli transformed the pure value of an option to its utility – the 
subjective value of goods – which then lead to models incorporating 
‘expected utility’ (Bernoulli, 1738). John Maynard Keynes thought 
about the meaning of risk beyond the pure probability of realization 
of an outcome (Keynes, 1921). Prospect theoretical approaches 
focused on the non-linearity of perceived risk given probabilities and 
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differing hedonic value of objectively similar prizes and losses 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Latest approaches try to incorporate 
relative hedonic value of outcomes (‘subjective expected pleasure’) by 
taking account things like surprisingness about the actual event 
(Mellers, 2000). All these developments followed the idea of the 
process of decision-making being consequentialistic. 
 The work on hand draws attention to emotions and what role 
they play when deciding to take a risk or not. Therefore it is 
questioned how emotions attached to the possible consequences of a 
decision affect behavior. With respect to this question additionally it 
is verified if such anticipations of emotions are exact or turn out as 
positive or negative dyed illusions. 
 Leaving behind this consequentialistic tradition the focus then 
is drawn on how immediate emotions connected to the decision 
problem itself influence which alternative is chosen – the risky or the 
save option. 
 The interrelation of both types of emotions is explored to find 
out if immediate emotions just can be seen as reflections of those 
anticipated. The interrelation of the immediate emotions connected to 
the option to take a risk and the option not to take it is examined to 
find out if the one can be said to be the negative mirror image of the 
other. 
 To find out how the content of anticipated and immediate 
emotions change when the decision problem is changed, the situation 
of deciding is manipulated: Either in changing the chances of winning 
or changing social dependencies connected to the decision. 
 It then is investigated to what extend the effect of the 
manipulation of the decision situation on behavior is transported by 
changes of the emotional content – either via immediate or 
anticipated emotions. 
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 Especially it is focused on how emotions affect the decision 
additionally and independent of subjective probability, changes of 
objective chances, the grade of ambiguity or the grade of social 
dependencies of the decision. 
 To follow this whole line of arguments the reader might find it 
helpful to use the Figure 1 down below. 
 I hope that this work contributes to the question what drives 
human behavior when deciding under risk and uncertainty. It could 
also be seen as a reflection about the question – to put it with Pascal 
– of how the specific interplay of body, heart and mind motivates 
decisions. 
 
 
immediate emotions 
take the risky option 
immediate emotions 
take the save option 
anticipated emotions 
save and losing 
anticipated emotions 
save and winning 
anticipated emotions 
risk and losing 
anticipated emotions 
risk and winning 
decision: 
take the risky option 
or 
take the save option 
changes in situation: 
different winning 
chances or 
social dependencies 
 
Figure 1: Framework of Argumentation
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2. What a feeling? 
What would Adam Smith think about the fact that his second large 
work, The wealth of nations (1776), is much more influential today in 
economics than his The theory of moral sentiments (1759)? 
Unfortunately we cannot ask him, but we do know that he put 
overwhelming effort into both. In his earlier book he investigated and 
emphasized the role that “passions” and their struggle with an 
“impartial spectator” within each of us, play in human behavior. 
Whereas, the more remembered book stands for the idea that 
economic behavior is motivated only by (rational) self-interest. Their 
very different fates regarding their reception may serve as a parable 
for the decline of interest in the power of emotions in economic 
judgment and decision making, and in almost the whole discipline of 
economics. The development of the common expected utility 
approach to describe the evaluation of options was accompanied by 
cutting out the emotional contents of utility. On that same way the 
happiness going with one alternative and not another was replaced 
by a calculation of own preference, fulfilling, at the least, the 
principles of weak order, independence and continuity (Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944; Savage, 1954; Anand, 1993; Anscombe and 
Aumann, 1963; Schmeidler, 1989; Camerer, 1995). The idea of risk – 
with all its bells and whistles like the weighing of information 
acknowledged already by Keynes (1921) – accordingly was reduced to 
the probabilities of (or the belief in) the realization of outcomes.  
 More descriptive approaches, like the prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), also focus on a calculating impartial 
spectator, albeit one who is imperfect or ‘biased’. Consequently, 
expected-utility based theories presume that decisions are 
predictable because people think about the likelihood and severity of 
consequences of all possible alternatives and translate that 
information, by some calculation process, into their actual choice 
(Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, Welch, 2001). This calculation process 
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might be biased or include errors (bounded rationality, heuristics), 
but at least it is assumed to be a process of higher order. Thus, for a 
long time, economic theory acted as though emotions played little or 
no role in decision making – that people chose to risk (or not) based 
on the cold calculation of expectations. To be sure, outcomes brought 
pleasure, but the degree of pleasure merely entered into the cold 
calculation that was consequentialistic in nature. 
 Here, we suggest that emotions do play a central role when 
decisions are made under risk and uncertainty. Furthermore we 
show that not only emotions attached to the outcomes influence 
decisions, but that immediate emotions emerging from the decision 
process itself have a strong effect on actual behavior. 
2.1. Decisions and Emotions 
Recently, there has been a revival of interest in emotions among 
economists (van Winden, 2007; Bosman and van Winden, 2006; 
Elster, 1998, 1994). In the early 1980’s, regret and disappointment 
were analyzed formally by Loomes and Sudgen (1982, 1986), as well 
as Bell (1982, 1985), then later by Wu (1999). However, all so far 
upcoming approaches assumed that the decision maker was 
consequentialistic, as described above. This can be said for most 
psychological approaches also: Mellers and others, in their decision 
affect and subjective expected pleasure theory, focus on anticipated 
emotions (Haselhuhn, Mellers, 2005; Mellers, McGraw, 2001; Mellers, 
2000; Mellers, Ritov, Schwarz, 1999). In gambles they showed how 
anticipated pleasure about an obtained outcome decreased when an 
unobtained outcome became more desirable (disappointment). When 
the outcome of an unchosen gamble was more appealing, the 
anticipated pleasure from the less attractive, chosen gamble 
decreased (regret). Besides these comparison effects, Mellers et al. 
were also able to show how surprisingness (a small probability that a 
specific outcome occurs) amplifies anticipated pleasure or pain of 
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that option and hence, differs from the pure utility of that option. It 
was also shown how these systematic deviations, captured in their 
concept of subjective expected pleasure, contribute to the prediction 
of choice beyond subjective expected utility.  
 A different perspective is taken by the affect-as-information 
theory (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway, 1994; Schwarz, Clore, 1988, 
1983). Here the affect, attached to specific risks, serves as 
information that changes the emotional content, and hence the value 
of anticipated outcomes (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, McGregor, 2004; 
Slovic and Peters, McGregor, Finucane, 2005). Thus, a positive affect 
makes pleasurable outcomes seem better, and a negative affect 
makes the probability of a bad outcome seem higher. Hence, in this 
theory affect is assumed to operate on traditionally economic and 
consequentialistic factors, including probability and value of 
outcomes. 
 Slovic and colleagues also showed how changing the 
presentation of probabilities from frequency to a percentage format 
increased clinicians’ willingness to discharge patients who actually 
presented the same dangerousness to public safety (Slovic, Monahan, 
and McGregor, 2000). They also showed that expressing a gamble in 
probability terms affects the attractiveness of a gamble much more 
strongly than the monetary outcome (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). 
This proportion dominance declines when there is a chance of losing 
a small amount. These results are explained with a process of 
affective mapping, where probability per se maps on a scale of 
attractiveness. However, a monetary outcome finds its place on the 
scale only by contrast with another non-zero outcome (e.g., a loss). 
Consequently, as the anticipated affect of outcomes increases (e.g., 
from winning or losing a little money to a lottery jackpot, or a positive 
HIV test), the influence of variation in outcome probability decreases 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001). Such effective tags influence behavior, 
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even when the information that causes these effects remains 
unconscious (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, and Johnson, 2000). 
 Contrary to described approaches, cognition-based approaches 
analyze intuitions as preferences. By design, there is no room left for 
inquiry into the effects of emotions. A special case is the extended 
expected utility model by Chaplin and Leahy (2001), who integrated 
anticipatory anxiety evoked by uncertainty (and not risk) about future 
options. This model builds, in part, on the approach suggested by 
Elster and Loewenstein (1992) that utility may also be gained from 
anticipation as well as from memory. However, it has been shown by 
Elster (1998) that incorporation of emotions as psychic costs or 
benefits, or as a source of (temporary) preferences, is insufficient to 
explain motivations or resulting behavior. 
 Findings of Bechara et al. (1997), in line with Damasio, show 
that subjects with “normal” emotional reactions (without brain-
damage in the area of the frontal lobes) “began to generate 
anticipatory skin conductance responses whenever they pondered a 
choice that turned out to be risky, whereas patients [with pre-frontal 
damage] never developed anticipatory skin conductance responses, 
although some eventually realized which choice where risky”. These 
results show that conscious awareness of costs and benefits is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for rational choice (Elster, 1998). 
Earlier, Damasio (1994) found that those patients being “emotionally 
flat” tended to make “worse” trails of choices compared to normal 
subjects, when deciding to draw from either more or less risky decks 
of cards. The patients showed normal skin conductance reactions to 
monetary loss, but showed no such anticipatory responses in the 
situation of immediately making their selection of a card from a bad 
deck. 
2.1.1. Risk-as-Feelings 
Our attempt to implicate emotions in decision making is most 
squarely understood as an operationalization of the risk-as-feelings 
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hypothesis (Loewenstein et al., 2001). This hypothesis states “that 
feelings play a much more prominent role in risky decision making 
than they are given credit for by the cognitive-consequentiality 
tradition of J/DM [judgement and decision-making] research” 
(Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 274).  
 The theory proposes “a distinction between anticipatory 
emotions and anticipated emotions. Anticipatory emotions are 
immediate visceral reactions (e.g., fear, anxiety, dread) to risks and 
uncertainties. Anticipated emotions are typically not experienced in 
the immediate present but are expected to be experienced in the 
future.” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 267). Anticipated emotions are 
the answer to the appropriate question “How will you feel when the 
decision for alternative X leads to consequence Y?”. In contrast to this 
consequentialistic view, Loewenstein et al. define anticipatory (or 
immediate) feelings as “gut feelings experienced at the moment of 
making a decision, which are often quite independent of the 
consequences of the decision.” They suggest that gut feelings “can 
play a critical role in the choice one eventually makes” (Loewenstein 
et al., 2001, p. 281). The appropriate question for immediate feelings 
reads “How do you feel in the moment of choosing alternative X?”  
 Following this differentiation of the Risk-as-Feelings theory, our 
approach is not consequentialistic. Our approach is not only 
concerned with reproducing results indicating that emotions, in 
general, do matter. Our approach specifically attempts to provide 
greater insight into how immediate emotions come into play. How 
much explanatory power do these emotions possess? Are they are 
connected to the anticipated emotions attached to outcomes or do 
they stand independent of them? Finally, do both types of emotion 
explain anything beyond subjective probability?  
 Thus, in our analysis, we aim at finding out what specific 
contribution to the decision is carried out by immediate and 
anticipated emotions. Furthermore, our analysis is an attempt to 
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separate the impact of emotion that is not due to cognitive factors, 
such as subjective probability. Additionally we want to find out how 
changes in cognitive evaluation (by changing actual probabilities) 
gave rise to feelings that, in turn, affect the decision.  
 In our approach, immediate emotions are defined as integral 
emotions, which are caused by the decision itself. It is not about 
incidental emotions caused by factors which are not related to the 
decision problem but are external (Pfister and Böhm, 2008). 
 Up until now, immediate emotions were merely objects of 
research. Therefore, we do not have a specific theory about their 
content. However, it seems reasonable that these contents may vary 
depending on situational and individual differences. It also seems 
reasonable to hypothesize that if these variations exist, they will 
influence decisions. So, with respect to the emotional content, the 
following studies are explorative. 
2.1.2. Predictions 
In all, we conducted four studies to examine the role played by 
immediate and anticipated emotions in risky decision making. In 
each study, we asked five specific questions. First, to what extent was 
the decision to take or avoid a risk influenced by changes in objective 
or subjective probabilities? Second, to what extent did anticipated 
and immediate emotions predict a person’s decision to take a risk or 
to avoid one? Third, what was the relationship between immediate 
and anticipated emotions? Was their impact on decision-making 
independent, or did immediate emotions mediate the relationship 
between anticipated emotions and the decision the participants 
made? Fourth, were these emotions produced by or related to 
cognitive factors, such as subjective probability, or did they stand 
independent of such factors? Fifth, were immediate emotions 
connected to both alternatives of a decision independent of one 
another? Finally, in the fourth Study, we asked if effects of 
anticipated emotions are the result of exact anticipations or biased 
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illusions. The design of the first study allowed for answering of all 
raised questions, except the first and the last one. The first question, 
then, was addressed during the second, third and fourth studies, the 
last only in Study 4. 
2.2. Study 1: Coin Flip 
In all studies, participants made decisions under risk or uncertainty. 
A very easy form of such a situation is to bet money on a coin flip. 
Thus, this is exactly what we asked participants to do in the first 
study. We asked participants to express their emotions, both at an 
immediate and anticipated level, and examined to what extent these 
emotions predicted who would choose to gamble on a coin flip and 
who would pass on the opportunity. 
2.2.1. Method 
 Participants. Eighty-seven participants (33 male, 54 female) 
were given a chance to gamble €5 on a coin flip toss to possibly win 
€10. One male participant had to be excluded because his answers 
suggested he did not take the situation seriously. Participants were 
visitors at a lecture at the University of Cologne in Germany, and 
were between 21 and 33 years of age (M=24.44). Most of the 
participants studied business administration (70.1%), some studied 
economics or social sciences (13.7%); the remainder had other 
majors. 
 Material and procedures. All participants received an 
envelope containing the questionnaire and €5. Anonymity was 
assured by generating an individual password via a specific rule. The 
participants then had to indicate their emotional states thinking 
about all four possible anticipated outcomes with the following 
verbalization of the situations: 
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 1. “Imagine you decided to keep the €5. And the coin flip shows 
that you have lost. This means: you get a total of €5. Your decision 
not to flip the coin induced not to lose the €5.” 
 2. “Imagine you decided to keep the €5. And the coin flip shows 
that you have won. This means: you get a total of €10. Your decision 
not to flip the coin induced not to double the €5 to €10.” 
 3. “Imagine you decided to bet the €5. And the coin flip shows 
that you have lost. This means: you get a nothing (€0). Your decision 
to flip the coin induced to lose the €5.” 
 4. “Imagine you decided to bet the €5. And the coin flip shows 
that you have won. This means: you get a total of €10. Your decision 
to flip the coin induced to double the €5 to €10.” 
All scenarios ended with the question “How do you feel in this 
situation?” and each was followed by a self-assessment manikin 
(SAM) instrument. 
 In the section regarding immediate emotions, participants were 
then asked to concentrate on feelings they sense immediately before 
they come to their decision:  
“Now it’s about the feelings you sense now, right in this moment 
immediately before you actually make your decision to flip the coin or 
not. So please concentrate on the upcoming decision and describe the 
feelings connected to this. For this reason, we will now ask you how 
you would feel with both alternatives available to you.” 
 For both possible immediate situations of betting or keeping the 
money, participants then had to indicate their emotional state again 
via SAMs after the following questions: 
1. “Assuming you bet the €5 by flipping the coin. How would you feel 
in doing so?”. 2. “Assuming you keep the €5 by not flipping the coin. 
How would you feel in doing so?”. 
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After these questions, and before presenting the SAMs for each of the 
questions, the following was added: “Please fill out the following SAMs 
in any case, even if you won’t decide in this way.” 
 The order of the immediate and anticipated measurements was 
altered. No order effects on the decision were noticed. We then asked 
the participants to make their concrete decision, as to whether or not 
to flip the coin, and if so, to tell us their winning side. Those not 
betting just kept the money they received before; those taking the 
chance to double the money laid the €5 back into the envelope. Once 
everybody finished, questionnaires were collected and the coin was 
flipped by a volunteer in front of the class. This coin flip was 
representative for all those betting. At the end of the lecture (about 1 
hour later), we handed over the prize of €10 to all winners using 
envelopes with their individual passwords printed on them. 
 Assessment of Emotions. Participants described their 
anticipated and immediate emotions via the Self-Assessment-Manikin 
(SAM) (Lang, 1980), which asks participants to describe their 
emotional state along three dimensions: pleasure, arousal and 
dominance. As seen in Figure 2 (p.18), each dimension is assessed by 
a 5-point scale. Pleasure is depicted on the SAM by a comic-like 
figure looking very happy on the very left side to very sad on right. 
Arousal is depicted by figures looking very aroused on one side to 
calm and relaxed on the other. Dominance is depicted by figures that 
vary in their size, from small to large. 
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Figure 2: The Self-Assessment-Manikin (SAM) 
 The visual method of the SAM has substantial advantages over 
verbal queries. Open questions tend to contain mostly post-
rationalizing statements, and closed queries always open the gate for 
attribution processes. A visual technique minimizes these problems 
(Morris, Woo, Geason, Kim, 2002; Poels and Dewitte, 2006). Morris 
(1995) also showed in several studies that the SAM allows for 
consistent measurement across cultures. The SAM allows fast and 
repeated measurement, which is important when measuring 
emotional states in imagined and real situations successively. The 
SAM is also a valid measure of emotion. Selected pictures of the 
International Picture System IAPS (CSEA, 1999) have been used 
together with the SAM, physiological measures like skin-conductance 
and heart-rate measures, and Facial Electromyographic (EMG) 
Measurement (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, Lan, 2001). The data 
show how well the SAM measurements fit to the physiological 
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measurements related to emotion (see also Arcos, Verdejo-García, 
Peralta-Ramírez, Sánchez-Barrera, Pérez-García, 2005; Hillmann, 
Rosengren and Smith, 2004; Güntekin and Basar, 2007; Dickert, in 
press; Hochman, Glöckner, and Yechiam, in press, for further 
validation data). Furthermore, SAM is easily integrated into a 
questionnaire-based study addressing cognitive systems. 
Nevertheless, SAM may be able to measure emotions as a sum of 
reactions to the entire process of decision. These reactions should 
include feelings informing the reasoning-based process and emotions 
released by this process. Beyond these, the reactions should also 
include feelings not mediated by the mind, due to direct visual access 
and empathic nearness to the SAM. This might hold the key to 
predicting risky decisions better than questions using specific 
emotional words (e.g., ‘regret’), inquiries about reasons, preferences 
or beliefs. 
2.2.2. Results and Discussion 
In all, 18 participants (20.7%) decided to flip the coin and 69 
participants (79.3%) kept their €5. How much were immediate and 
anticipated emotions related to that decision? Table 1 (p.20) displays 
how much emotional valence, for both anticipated and immediate 
measures, predicted whether people bet their money.  
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Model 1 
Anticipated emotions 
Model 2 
Immediate emotions 
Model 3 
All emotions 
Variable   
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
anticipated valence       
 keeping and losing - .17  .84   - .03  .98 
 keeping and winning - .75*  .47   - .70*  .50 
 betting and losing  .34 1.40   .23 1.26 
 betting and winning  .27 1.31   .27 1.31 
immediate valence             
 betting    .41 1.50  .46 1.58 
  keeping   - .91**  .40 - .84*  .43 
        
  constant - .55  .57  .52 1.69 0.33 1.39 
Nagelkerke's R²  .11   .16  0.23  
Significant effect on the decision to bet: *p < .05  **p< .01 ***p < .005       
∆R² Model 2 to Model 3 sig. (p<.03) 
 
Table 1: Study 1: Summary of Binary-logistic Regression Analysis for Valence within Immediate and Anticipated 
Scenarios Predicting the Decision to Bet. 
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 Anticipated valences as predictors. Binary regression Model 
1, in Table 1, includes only anticipated scenarios as predictors. The 
anticipated scenario of keeping & winning the money generates a 
significant coefficient. But this is not interpreted here because, 
overall, this first model does not support sufficient predictive power 
due to the fact that the increase of variance from the 0-Model is not 
significant (Nagelkerke’s R²=.10; 2 =5.9, p=.21). Hence, this model 
suggests that anticipated emotions do not solely predict peoples’ 
decisions to flip the coin1. 
 Immediate valences as predictors. The second model, in 
contrast, uses only the immediate emotion valence connected to the 
decision as predictors. Here, the valence of keeping the money 
significantly predicts the decision. The better the participants felt 
about keeping the money, the more they were willing keep it. By 
changing one unit to the positive on the 5-point valence scale, the 
chances to bet relative to the chances to keep the money are reduced 
by 60% ( e =.40, p<.01). This second model on its own gains sufficient 
predictive power against the 0-Model (Nagelkerke’s R²=.16; 2 = 9.4, 
p<.01).  
 Immediate and anticipated valences as predictors. The 
third model combines the previous two by adding anticipated 
emotions (1) to the immediate model (2). This leads to a significant 
increase of predictive power (Nagelkerke’s R²=.23; 2 = 7.70, p<.02). 
In this way, controlling for mutual influences, the only anticipated 
scenario significantly predicting the decision is the scenario of 
keeping and winning the money. The stronger the positive feelings the 
                                                 
1  In the following descriptions please take into account that negative values 
of the coefficient , in a logistic regression, map onto a value of e (the odds ratios) 
between 0 and 1. To the contrary, positive values of   realize a value of e larger 
than 1. This means that the strength of an effect can be seen more easily from 
the  , but the interpretation of effects is much easier with e . Note that values of 
e very close to 0 gain strong effects because it is the lower bound of the possible 
interval. 
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subjects predict to have in this situation, the less the subjects were 
willing to bet the money. This translates into anticipated 
disappointment. The less disappointment the subject is predicted to 
feel in the case of not taking the chance and winning, the easier is it 
to keep the money. Changing one unit to the positive on the 5-point 
scale of valence halves the chances to bet relative to the chances the 
subject will keep the money (  =-.70, e =.50, p<.05). Less anticipated 
disappointment about keeping and winning lowers the chances to bet 
(increases the chance to keep the money). Simultaneously, the 
influence of immediate emotions already shown in Model 1 stays 
stable in this combined Model. The immediate positive feelings 
connected to keeping the money significantly reduce the selection of 
the risky alternative (  =-.84, e =.43, p<.02).2  
 However, it might be the case that immediate emotions only 
mirror the anticipated emotions connected to the outcomes, and in 
this sense only act as straw-men of anticipations? 
 Interrelation of immediate and anticipated valence. On a 
bivariate level, the independence between the relevant anticipated 
and immediate valence described above, revealed by the fact that they 
fail to correlate significantly (r =.11, p=.32, Table 2 (p.23) shows 
correlations of the predictors used in the regression). Furthermore, 
no significant connection between the immediate valence in the case 
of betting the money and all other four anticipated measures of 
valence could be found. 
 
                                                 
2 To find out if these results might be explained by different levels of valence, 
evoked only by the decision in general, or if it stays substantially on an emotional, 
individual level, a 2x2 within-subject (measured valence at two different scenarios) 
by factor (between-subject: decision) analysis was conducted. It confirms that the 
interaction-effect of decision with the immediate emotions connected to betting vs. 
keeping the money is significant (p<.005). The same is true for the anticipated 
scenarios of keeping the money and winning vs. betting the money and winning 
(p<.053). Hence the results cannot be explained by a plain level effect of change in 
valence grouped by the decision. Deciding to bet or not to bet the money is 
influenced by anticipated and even more by immediate valence connected to the 
decision itself. 
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Variable   1 2 3 4 5 6 
anticipated valence        
 keeping and losing 1 1  .04 - .12  .29**  .07  .25* 
 keeping and winning 2   1  .31** - .17  .08  .11 
 betting and losing 3     1 - .32**  .00 - .17 
 betting and winning 4       1  .19  .26* 
immediate valence        
 betting 5         1  .09 
  keeping 6           1 
significant correlations (two-sided): *p < .05  **p< .01         
Table 2: Study 1: Correlations of Valence within Immediate and Anticipated 
Situations. 
 The immediate valence for the case of keeping the money is 
moderately positively connected to the anticipated valence in the case 
of keeping and losing (r =.25, p=.02), as well as betting and winning (r 
=.26, p=.02). Taken together, these findings show that both 
immediate emotions are not just mirrored anticipated emotions. But 
the latter connection questions for a closer inquiry into its causes 
aiming to an answer to the question if immediate emotions might be 
only mediators of those anticipated. 
 The valence indicated in the immediate scenario of keeping the 
money – the one which significantly influences the decision – could 
be found to be moderately connected only to anticipated scenarios, 
which had no significant influence on the decision. Hence, it is 
impossible for immediate emotional states to only be mediators 
transporting the effect of anticipated emotions on the decision. The 
influence of immediate and anticipated emotions on the decision 
could be found to act independently – as it was confirmed in 
regression Model 3.  
 Interrelation of both immediate valences. The question still 
remains if both immediate emotions are not connected just perfectly 
with each other, in a sense that feeling good in the immediate 
scenario of taking a risk automatically leads to feeling bad when 
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keeping the money. The connection between the immediate valence in 
the case of betting versus keeping the money, could be found to be 
insignificant (r=.09, p<.41). This shows that immediate valence in the 
case of keeping the money is not just the opposite of valence in the 
case of betting. This finding reveals that immediate emotions 
regarding choosing a risky option or not do not map onto one single 
dimension of valence (or utility). Therefore, it points to an analysis 
which should capture more emotional content. 
2.2.3. Summary of Study 1  
The results of Study 1 show that immediate and anticipated valence 
can predict the decision to flip a coin up to a substantial level. Both 
types of emotions, in the form of measured valence controlled for 
their interrelations, significantly affect the decision. In this study we 
did not try to capture beliefs about the likeliness of winning 
(subjective probability). To determine how this belief is connected to 
the decision and how that interacts with emotions we measured it in 
the following Study 2. Additionally, we will now switch the perspective 
on the three measured dimensions of emotions from a one-
dimensional to a more complex one. 
2.3. Study 2: Throwing a Die  
The second study answers the question of how subjective probability 
effects the decision accomplished by, and compared to, richer 
measured emotional influences. Because such a small group of 
participants decided to gamble in the coin-flip study, we decided to 
raise the proportion of people gambling by making the odds of 
winning more favorable. In addition, all three dimensions (valence, 
arousal, dominance) were used as predictors in a specific manner. 
 In the study, participants were asked to throw a die, and had a 
66% chance of winning. As in Study 1, their immediate and 
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anticipated emotions were measured to see how well these emotions 
predicted the choices that participants made. 
2.3.1. Method 
 Participants. 167 participants of a psychology class at the 
University of Cologne were asked if they would like to take the chance 
to double €5 by throwing a die. Aged between 19 and 32 (M=24.6), 
most of the participants studied business administration (62.7%), 
some studied economics or social sciences (22.3%), and the rest had 
other varying majors. 
 Material and procedures. The winning chances were fixed to 
4/6 (66.6%). Participants were told they would win €10 when a 6, 5, 
4, or 3 showed up. Otherwise, they would lose their money. As 
always, this was not a simulation but a real event3. The general 
proceeding of the experiment was explained, the possibility to ask 
questions personally was assured. The procedure replicated that of 
Study 1 in detail. Additionally, participants gave a measure of their 
subjective probability (or belief in winning) by answering the following 
question. “Independent of the alternative you actually chose, how 
probable do you think is it that you personally will win?” on a 7-point 
scale ranging from “absolutely not probable” to “extreme probable”. 
2.3.2. Results and Discussion 
Overall, 110 out of 167 participants decided to throw the die in an 
attempt to double their €5 to €10 (65.5%); 57 participants decided to 
keep their money without rolling the die (34.5%). 
 Clustered Emotional States. Contrary to the first study, the 
analysis used here was now enriched, using all three dimensions to 
capture the potentially more complex nature of the participants' 
emotional states. All individual emotional profiles from all emotional 
measures within the six situations (two immediate, four anticipated) 
                                                 
3 I thank Hannes Fetchenhauer for reasonable help playing the part of The Good 
Luck Fairy. 
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were classified using a two-step cluster analysis4. In order to 
investigate how emotions and choosing a risky option are connected, 
the results of the measurements of the SAM in the four anticipated 
and the two immediate scenarios form the basis for a clustering 
process. This data classification groups the emotions indicated by 
each individual via SAM within the six scenarios in the form of 
clusters within each one of the six scenarios. Thus, for every scenario 
a different cluster solution can be found, most probable resulting in 
A) different emotional meaning of the clusters and B) a different 
number of clusters for each scenario.  
 For example, imagine the immediate emotions someone might 
feel when deciding to bet the money. A cluster analysis, based on how 
people rated valence, arousal, and dominance associated with betting 
the money, might result in two groups that are rather distinct from 
one another in their ratings, but rather uniform internally. For 
example, two clusters like those in Figure 3 (p.27) might result. 
                                                 
4  applying a log-likelihood-approximation using the Bayesian Information 
Criterion for goodness of fit. 
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Figure 3: Two samples for emotional clusters displayed on the SAM (bold: cluster 
1, dashed: cluster 2) 
 Group 1, on average, might perceive negative valence combined 
with higher arousal and low dominance, which might lead 
participants to avoid the act of betting. The second group (cluster 2) 
might perceive higher arousal connected with more positive valence 
and a feeling of higher dominance, which might lead participants to 
choose the thrilling and exciting option of betting. We should again 
note that the cluster process is open in number; for different 
scenarios, a different number of clusters may be extracted. 
 In a second step, for easier handling and understanding, these 
clusters were given labels. The average values on the three 
dimensions of each cluster were translated into distinctive emotional 
words via an emotional dictionary. Where did this dictionary 
originate? 151 emotional words (Russel and Mehrabian , 1977) were 
translated by Fischer and Brauns (1998) into 145 German emotional 
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terms. Subsets of these words then were presented in a large series of 
studies (N=567) to groups of students. For every word, these subjects 
had to indicate the meaning of that specific emotional word on the 
SAM (Fischer et. al, 2002). We use this dictionary to retranslate the 
three average values of one cluster to a specific emotional term.  To 
gain a wider spectrum of emotional words, the given standard 
deviation of the collected data for a specific emotional term was 
varied analogously for every dimension from +0, +- 0.05 and +- 0.1. 
Changing the wideness of the target corridors consequently leads to a 
varying degree of specification. In this way, at least one emotional 
term was assigned to every cluster as a label. If more than one word 
is mentioned in the following descriptions, this assigning occurs with 
a decreasing degree of specificity. 
 We should note that this analysis is exploratory. The emotional 
labels given to clusters should help us to understand what is going 
on. We do not claim that every subject captured in the clusters of 
averaged emotional states feels like we describe it – especially due to 
the fact that the labels of that averages base on information gained 
from other subject pools. However, this is an attempt to understand 
the emotional content, and as you will see these labels make much 
sense in the current context. 
 Dimensional vs. cluster approach. Evidence for that the 
cluster approach does not lead to distortions of results is given by the 
comparison with the results of a traditional, one-dimensional, 
perspective just using the dimension of valence in Table 4 (p.31). 
Regarding which emotional scenarios are relevant for the decision, 
the results using clusters of emotional states are mostly similar to 
those given by only the valence. However, it is apparent that the 
cluster approach is more appropriate in the sense that interactions of 
valence, arousal and dominance are incorporated without overloading 
the regression with too many predictors, which would be the case for 
three dimensions and their interactions for all six scenarios are used 
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(6*6 predictors). Additionally, the labels given for grouped emotional 
states give an intuitive meaning of what emotions play a role in the 
scenarios. For a comparison of the traditional and the new cluster 
approach, refer to the comparison of Table 4 (p.31) with Table 3 
(p.30). In the following we only describe the results of the new cluster 
approach. 
 Regression. The cluster memberships in the four anticipated 
and the two immediate situations, as well as subjective probability, 
were used as predictors for the decision to bet or keep the money in a 
binary logistic regression. Model 1 used subjective probability as the 
only predictor. Hence, Model 1 answers the question to what extent 
the decision to take or avoid a risk was solely influenced by subjective 
probability.
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Effects of Membership of the numbered Cluster relative to the Membership of the last Cluster for all six Situations. 
                    
   
Model 1 Model 2 
Anticipated emotions 
Model 3 
Immediate emotions 
Model 4 
All predictors 
Variable     
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B Effect: Exp(B) 
anticipated emotions          
 keeping and losing Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1    .41 1.5    .19 1.22 
 keeping and winning Cluster 3        
  Cluster 1   - .47 0.62  - .13  .88 
  Cluster 2   -1.11  .33  - .72  .49 
 betting and losing Cluster 3         
  Cluster 1   -0.74  .48  -1.35*  .26 
  Cluster 2   -0.08  .92  -0.40  .67 
 betting and winning Cluster 4         
  Cluster 1   - .05  .95  0.14 1.15 
  Cluster 2   - .05  .95  -0.15  .86 
  Cluster 3   - .21  .81  -0.12  .88 
immediate emotions                   
 betting Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1     - .26  .77  .21 1.23 
 keeping Cluster 3         
  Cluster 1     -1.61***  .2 -1.88***  .15 
  Cluster 2     - .13  .88 - .21  .81 
  subjective probability    .53*** 1.69  .51*** 1.67  .59*** 1.81  .62*** 1.86 
 constant  -1.92  .15 -1.38  .25 -1.57  .21 -1.15  .32 
Nagelkerke's R²    .13   .18   .26   .31  
Significant effect on the decision to bet: *p < .05  **p< .01 ***p < .001             
∆R² Model 1 to Model 2 n.s.; ∆R² Model 1 to Model 3 sig. (p<.001); ∆R² Model 3 to Model 4 n.s. (p<.49) 
Table 3: Study 2: Summary of Binary-logistic Regression Analysis for Clusters of Emotional States within Immediate and Anticipated Scenarios 
Predicting the Decision to Bet or to Keep the Money. 
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Model 1 
Subjective probability 
Model 2 
Anticipated emotions 
Model 3 
Immediate emotions 
Model 4 
All predictors 
Variable   
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
anticipated va  lence         
 keeping and losing   - .76  .47   - .43  .65 
 keeping and winning   - .56†  .57   - .25  .78 
 betting and losing    .91† 2.48  1.09† 2.98 
 betting and winning   - .46  .63  - .12  .89 
immediate valence                 
 betting     1.01** 2.74  .61 1.83 
 keeping     -1.72***  .18 -1.83***  .16 
  subjective probability  .53*** 1.69  .53*** 1.69  .51*** 1.66  .49*** 1.64 
  constant -1.70  .18 - .2  .82 -1.45  .23 -0.27 0.77 
Nagelkerke's R²  .12   .19   .28   .32  
Significant effect on the decision to bet: †p<.10 *p < .05  **p< .01 ***p < .005         
∆R² Model 1 to 2 marg sig. (p<.075), Model 1 to Model 3 sig. (p<.001), Model 2 to 4 sig. (p<.001), Model 3 to 4 n.s. (p<.32) 
Table 4: Study 2: Summary of Binary-logistic Regression Analysis for Valence within Immediate and Anticipated Scenarios Predicting the 
Decision to Bet. 
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 Subjective probability as predictor. As seen in Table 3, 
subjective probability significantly predicted the decision to gamble. 
Those participants who decided to bet saw their average chance of 
winning with M=4.9 (SD = 1.04) substantially higher than those who 
kept their money (M=4.0, SD = 1.48). This difference in the subjective 
probability of winning is significant (t(164) =-4.00, p<.001). In a 
logistic regression (Table 3, Model 1), this means that a one unit 
change on the scale of subjective probability induces an increase of 
the odds to bet versus not to bet with 169% ( e = 1.69, p<.001).  
 Anticipated emotions as predictors. Model 2 added 
anticipated emotions into the mix. This is done to gauge whether they 
predict additional variance beyond subjective probability. As seen in 
Table 3, the relationship between anticipated emotions and the 
decision was non-significant. Additionally, the change in the models 
predictive power against Model 1 reveals to be not significant 
(Nagelkerke’s R² =.05, 2 =6.1, p=.64). This also holds true when 
stepping from a 0-Model (no predictors, only constant) directly to 
Model 2, without subjective probability as a predictor.  
 Immediate emotions as predictors. Model 3 assessed the 
relationship of immediate emotions, along with subjective probability, 
on the decision to gamble. The model shows that immediate emotions 
regarding keeping the money predicted significant variance. Being a 
member of cluster 1 strongly reduced the odds of betting by a factor 
of 1/5 ( e =.20, p<.001) relative to those belonging to cluster 3. The 
emotional state captured in cluster 1 is translated to the emotional 
terms ‘interested’ and ‘activated’. Cluster 3 is translated to 
‘astonished’ and ‘tense’. Consequently 70.9% of the participants in 
cluster 3 decided to bet their money; the majority were wondering 
why to keep it. Contrary to this, only 45.3% of those captured in the 
first cluster did so; thus, a minority was wondering whether to keep 
their money in this case. Contrary to Model 2, this shows the 
immediate emotions raised by the decision problem itself, and not 
33 
those emotions attached to the outcomes that affect the decision to 
take a risk or not. 
 Immediate and anticipated emotions as predictors. Model 
4 takes into account immediate and anticipated emotions along with 
subjective probability, affirming the role played by immediate 
emotions. The factor of reducing odds for the immediate emotional 
measures captured by asking “You keep the money and do not throw 
the die” is reduced to 1/6.6 ( e =.15, p<.001). The impact of 
anticipated emotions for one scenario becomes significant, but weak. 
Only the situation of throwing the die and losing gained significant 
influence ( e =.26, p<.05). The reactions to the connected question 
“You decided to throw the die. The die shows you lost” can be 
captured in two clusters. Participants grouped in cluster 1, on 
average, indicated a feeling translated to the strong emotional words 
of ‘dread’, ‘fearful’ or ‘helpless’. Of those 54.9% decided not to take a 
risk and kept their money. On the contrary, cluster 3 encompasses 
those whose feelings translate to ‘angry but objective’ and 
‘wonderingly’. Consequently, a larger majority of 71.9% decided to 
bet, anticipating less strong feelings compared to those of the 1st 
cluster. In short regression terms, this means that if the subject is a 
member of cluster 1 (‘dread’, ‘fearful’, ‘helpless’, similar to anticipated 
regret of taken the risk), the ratio of the odds of gambling reduces 
with a factor of e =.26 (1/3.85) compared to the odds of those 
belonging to cluster 3 (‘angry but objective’, ‘wonderingly’ similar to 
anticipated disappointment). Given these results, the question should 
be answered if immediate emotions might only be reflections of the 
emotions anticipated for the outcomes. 
 Interrelation of immediate and anticipated emotions. The 
cluster memberships for the relevant immediate emotions when 
keeping the money are independent of those in the relevant 
anticipated scenario of betting the money and losing ( =.22, n.s.). 
This shows that the immediate emotional state cannot be seen as a 
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simple reflection of the anticipated emotional states. Note again that 
this finding is also confirmed with the last model 4, including all 
predictors simultaneously where immediate emotions independently 
gain substantial influence beyond subjective probability or 
anticipated emotions. 
 Interrelation of subjective probability and emotions. How 
are the emotional cluster-memberships within the scenarios relevant 
for the decision related to subjective probability? A multinomial 
regression, with the subjective probability as the independent 
variable and the cluster-memberships as the dependent variable, 
reveals that a significant interrelation exists. However, for the 
immediate emotions in the case of keeping the money, the 
explanatory power of subjective probability is rather weak 
(Nagelkerke’s R²=.045). This weakness is also reflected by a rather 
low value (spans from 0 to 1) of the directional measure   of .22 
assuming the cluster-membership as the dependent. For the 
anticipated emotions in the scenario of betting and losing, the 
multinomial regression reveals that there is no significant 
interrelation (Nagelkerke’s R²=.019).   yields a quite similar but also 
low value of .21, reflecting, again, the findings of the regression in 
Model 4. Both types of emotions affect the decision independently of 
subjective probability. 
 Is it possible that the effect of subjective probability (the 
chances participants believe to have that they personally will win) on 
the decision is mediated by emotions? Are emotions only triggered by 
subjective beliefs? The regression model already pointed in the 
direction a mediation analysis reveals, no significant indirect effects 
via emotions could be found (p<.05). To sum this up, both types of 
emotions affect the decision of whether or not to take a risk, 
independent of subjective probability. 
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 Do the immediate emotional states follow a simple structure in 
a sense that the one is the just opposite of the other? Study 1 already 
showed that this might not be the case. 
 Interrelation of both immediate emotions. The cluster-
memberships of both immediate situations were statistically 
independent from each other ( 2 = 3.88, n.s.;  =.15, n.s.). This shows 
that there is not an easy on/off structure of immediate emotions 
determining the decision, but that there are complex emotional states 
to capture.  
2.3.3. Summary of Study 2 
In summary, the results of Study 2 show the following: there is a 
strong relationship of subjective probability to the decisions made by 
the participants. Anticipated emotions only show weak influence 
overall. However, there is also found immediate emotions connected 
to the situation of keeping the money predict the decisions 
participants made substantially. Their influence on the decision is 
immune to possible interrelations with subjective probability and 
anticipated emotions. The independence of the relevant immediate 
and anticipated emotional state is confirmed, the former is not the 
mirror of the latter. Immediate emotions connected to both 
alternatives found to be independent of each other, too. A comparison 
of the new cluster based approach and a traditional perspective using 
valence as a predictor of the decision reveals that clustering does not 
lead to distortions of the results’ structure. 
2.4. Study 3: Altering Objective Probabilities 
In the previous study, we measured the participants’ subjective 
beliefs of winning. With this third study, we aim to investigate how 
actively changing the objective chances of winning influences 
decisions and emotions. Is it possible that changing one’s chances 
alters one's emotional reactions to gambling, and thus alters one's 
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willingness to gamble? Is there a mediating function of immediate (or, 
of anticipated) emotions? To find out, we grouped participants into 
five conditions, each of them with a different chance of winning, and 
asked them to throw another die. 
2.4.1. Method 
 Participants. Participants were attendees (127) of a beginner-
level lecture at the University of Cologne (economics faculty), were 
aged 21 to 33 (M=24.52), and were asked to take the chance to 
double €5 to €10 by throwing a die. Of the participants, 77 (61.1%) 
were female, 49 (38.9%) male, and one of unknown gender. 70.6% of 
them studied business, 11.1% studied economics or social sciences, 
and the rest studied various other majors. 
 Material and procedures. Subjects received an envelope 
containing a password procedure, the questionnaire and €5. Five 
different, equally distributed, versions of the questionnaire (each 
given to 25±1 participants) were generated. The chance of winning 
varied from a minimal 1/6 (“You win if a 6 shows up.”) to 5/6 (“You 
win if a 6, 5, 4, 3 or 2 shows up.”). The general procedure of the 
experiment was explained aloud, ensuring the possibility to ask 
questions. The procedure replicated Study 2 with one exception. 
Participants’ views of subjective probability of winning were not 
collected. Nevertheless, we think that these results provide additional 
insight into the role of emotions when choosing risky options. This is 
achieved through analyzing possible mediation of the effect of 
changing probabilities on the decision by emotions. 
2.4.2. Results and Discussion 
A total of 42 (33.1%) participants decided to gamble on the die, while 
85 (66.9%) participants decided to keep the money. The objective 
probability of winning had a clear impact on the likelihood that 
participants would gamble. Among those with the lowest chance of 
1/6, nobody bet their money; among those with a chance of 2/6, 
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7.7% bet the money; of those with a chance of 3/6), 34.9% threw the 
die; of those with a chance of 4/6, 50% tried their luck; and, among 
those with the highest chance of winning (5/6), 75% of the subjects 
gambled. 
 Obviously, changing objective risks influence decisions. But 
what role did emotions play beyond that influence? To answer this 
question, we again conducted binary logistic regressions. In addition 
to the measures of immediate and anticipated emotions, objective 
probability was also included as an independent variable (Table 5, 
p.38). 
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Effects of Membership of the numbered Cluster relative to the Membership of the last Cluster for all six Situations. 
                    
   
Model 1 Model 2 
Anticipated emotions 
Model 3 
Immediate emotions 
Model 4 
All predictors 
Variable     
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
anticipated emotions          
 keeping and losing Cluster 3         
  Cluster 1    .50 1.64  1.27 3.55 
  Cluster 2    .50 1.64   1.32 3.75 
 keeping and winning Cluster 2        
  Cluster 1   -1.69***  .18  -1.73**  .18 
 betting and losing Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1   1.42** 4.13   .31 1.37 
 betting and winning Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1    .50 1.65   .39 1.47 
immediate emotions                   
 betting Cluster 3         
  Cluster 1     -0.12 0.89  .39 1.47 
  Cluster 2     - .03  .97  .59 1.81 
 keeping Cluster 3         
  Cluster 1     -1.59***  .20 -1.56*  .21 
  Cluster 2     - .68  .51 - .47  .63 
  objective probability   1.18*** 3.25        1.4 *** 4.07 
 constant  -4.63  .01 -1.21  .30  .05 1.05 -5.62 0.0 
Nagelkerke's R²    .43   .22   .10   .61  
Significant effect on the decision to bet: *p < .06  **p< .01 ***p < .001             
∆R² Model 1 to Model 4 sig. (p<.05), ∆R² Model 3 to Model 4 sig. (p<.005) 
Table 5: Study 3: Summary of Binary-logistic Regression Analysis for Clusters of Emotional States within Immediate and Anticipated Scenarios 
Predicting Decision to Bet or to Keep the Money. 
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 Objective probability as predictor. Model 1 only shows the 
influence of objective probability of winning (1/6 up to 5/6) on 
gambling. Belonging to a condition with a higher chance of winning 
(one step means +16.6%) led to an increase of the odds of betting the 
money with a factor of e = 3.25 (p<.001). This reflects the above 
descriptive results of proportions of betting, given the different 
conditions shown above. 
 Anticipated emotions as predictors. But what about the 
emotions participants connected to the different outcomes of the 
gamble? Model 2 solely shows their influence on the decision. 
Obviously, anticipated emotional states in the situation of betting and 
winning, as well as betting and losing, do play a role. Being a member 
of the emotional cluster 1 (‘confused’) and not cluster 2 (‘impotent, 
helpless’) for the scenario of betting and losing increases the chance 
of taking the risk vs. not taking the risk by 313% ( e =4.13, p<.01). 
The regret attached to the outcome of betting and losing comes along 
in two forms here: in a milder form of those grouped as feeling 
confused in a form of worry and irritation (cluster 1), and those 
feeling real anxiety of lost control and heavy regret (cluster 2). 
Consequently those in the latter group tend to keep their money more 
than the others. 
  Being a member of those grouped as ‘wondering, skeptic’ 
(cluster 1) and not a member of those labeled ‘confused, embarrassed’ 
(cluster 2) in the anticipated scenario of ‘keeping and winning’ 
reduces the odds to risk vs. keep the money by 82% ( e =.18, p<.001). 
Those grouped as ‘confused, embarrassed’ anticipate more 
disappointment when they will learn that they could have been better 
off by betting the money, because they would have won. So they are 
more willing to take the risk. Using solely anticipated emotions as 
predictors for the decision results in an explanatory power of 
Nagelkerke’s R² =.216. 
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 Immediate emotions as predictors. Model 3 solely includes 
immediate emotions as predictors. Here only emotions connected to 
keeping the money play a role. This effect remains quite unchanged 
in the combined Model 4, so for it’s detailed description please refer 
to the following description. For now, it can be said that emotional 
cluster-memberships in the immediate scenario of keeping the money 
affect the decision to take a risk or not. 
 Immediate and anticipated emotions as predictors. Model 
4 combines all predictors simultaneously and is the basis for the 
following interpretation. Adding the objective probability back into 
this last model reduces the influence of anticipated emotions of 
betting and losing that showed up in Model 2. There is a connection 
between subjective probability and anticipated emotions for which 
Model 4 controls for – see later explanation. Nevertheless the 
influence of the anticipated situation of keeping and winning stays 
stable. Belonging to cluster 1 (feeling ‘wondering’ and ‘skeptical’ 
75.6% do not bet) reduces the odds of betting vs. not betting by 
82.4% ( e =.18, p<.01; a factor of 1/5.7) compared to those belonging 
to cluster 2 (feeling ‘confused’ and ‘embarrassed’ only 47.5% do not 
bet). The latter group anticipates higher disappointment regarding not 
betting (especially showing lower values of valence and dominance) 
than those in cluster 1. Consequently, they are more driven to take 
the chance and bet. 
 What might immediate emotions’ additional contribution be? In 
the situation of keeping the money, belonging to cluster 1 (feeling 
‘friendly’, ‘cooperative’, ‘relaxed’ and ‘secure’) and not cluster 3 
(feeling ‘uninterested’) reduces the ratio of chances of betting the 
money vs. keeping the money with a factor of 1/4.7 ( e =.21, p<.057). 
Respectively 83.3% of those grouped in cluster 1 keep the money, 
66.7% of cluster 2 (‘astonished’ and ‘wondering’) and only 46.8% of 
those belonging to cluster 3 do so. For those in cluster 3, the option 
to keep the money just seems to be very uninteresting. 
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 In the combined model 4, the influence of objective probability 
is affirmed given the increased odds ratio of e =4.07, relative to 
Model 1 ( e =3.25). But despite this variable’s large predictive power 
on the decision, again both types of emotions played a significant 
unique role (model 1 to model 4: Nagelkerke’s R² = .18, p<.05). 
 Interrelation of immediate and anticipated emotions. Note 
that there is a weak dependency ( =.24, p<.031) between the 
emotional cluster memberships of the relevant immediate and 
anticipated scenarios. However, this connection is not strong enough 
to hinder anticipated and immediate emotions to contribute 
independently and significantly to the decision – as shown in 
regression model 4. Now that is has again been shown that both, 
immediate as well as anticipated, emotions do influence the decision 
to take a risk, the question arises of whether the effect of changes in 
objectives chances to win on the willingness to bet is mediated by 
emotions. 
 Interrelation of changes in probability and emotions. Do 
emotions, at least in part, explain the connection between objective 
probability and the decision to bet? That is, do anticipated or 
immediate emotions serve as a mediator between the chance to win 
and the decision to gamble? Our data suggest that immediate 
emotions do play a mediating role (Figure 4, p.42). 
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Figure 4: Study 3. How emotions mediate the effect of changes in probability to 
changes in behavior 
 
A multinomial regression, with the change in objective probability as 
a predictor and the membership in the emotional states as the 
dependent variable, shows a significant influence of the immediate 
emotional state in the situation of keeping the money (Nagelkerke’s R² 
=.14, p<.04;  =.36, p<.04), foremost predicting the membership to 
cluster 3 (where a majority bets the money). That these immediate 
emotional states in the situation of keeping the money significantly 
influence the decision was shown in Table 5 (p.38), Model 4. To 
conclude mediation, it has to be shown that the direct effect of 
changing objective probabilities on the decisions is significantly 
reduced when mediators in the form of relevant emotional states are 
added simultaneously. By controlling for non-normality distribution 
of the indirect effect, a bootstrap test with 5000 re-samples (Baron 
and Kenny, 1986; Kenny, 2008; Preacher and Hayes, 2008a, 2004) 
reveals that this is indeed the case for the mentioned immediate 
emotions (with a 4% probability to err). The effect size measured as 
index of mediation (Preacher and Hayes, 2008b) yielded an effect of 
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.084 (lower level 96% confidence interval = .001, upper level 96% 
confidence interval = .242). Following MacKinnon and Dywer (1993) 
and Sobel (1982) the indirect effect size measured as the proportion 
of the total effect that is mediated yielded 7.05%. Note that such a 
specific indirect effect could only be found along the immediate but 
not with any of the anticipated emotions5. 
 Interrelation of both immediate emotions. Can it be said, 
again, that the structure of emotional states within both immediate 
scenarios was independent of one another? Are the emotions 
connected to keeping the money just the opposite of those connected 
to taking a risk? No. Independence is again confirmed here ( =.22, 
Cramers’ V=.16, p<.20). 
2.4.3. Summary of Study 3 
In summary, Study 3 showed the unique impact of both types of 
emotions on the decision to throw a die. The results show the strong 
effect of objective changes in probability. Anticipated emotions gain 
significant influence on the decision. Beyond that, immediate 
emotions influence the decisions directly and carry additional effects 
of changing probabilities as a mediator. 
2.5. Study 4: Ellsberg – Risk vs. Uncertainty 
The first three studies examined simple decisions under risk. With 
the fourth study, we applied our approach to a classical paradigm of 
decision-making research: The Ellsberg-paradox (which is similar to 
Keynes’ pedagogical example in Treatise on Probability, 1921). 
  Imagine the following situation: “You now have the possibility 
to win $5, based on which chip is drawn out of an urn. There are two 
urns to choose from: Urn 1 contains a total of 100 chips, some chips 
                                                 
5  These tests were conducted with the latest available scripts by Preacher & 
Hayes (2004, 2008) and were confirmed with Mplus software Version 5.2 (Muthén, 
L.K. and Muthén, B.O. (1998-2007) 
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are red and some are black. Urn 2 contains a total of 100 chips, 50 of 
these are red and 50 are black. You choose which color wins: if a chip 
of that color is drawn, you have won. In this case, you win $5. If a 
chip of the other color is drawn you lose and therefore receive $0.” 
 Most people decide against the ambiguous first urn. But this 
observation is inconsistent with expected utility theory because it 
implies that the subjective probabilities of black and red are greater 
in the 50:50 urn than in the unknown urn, and therefore cannot sum 
to one for both urns (Fox and Tversky, 1995). Obviously most people 
don’t automatically draw the analogy to Raiffa’s (1961) reasoning that 
ambiguity always can be reduced to risk by tossing a coin to decide 
whether to guess red or black. Another way to come to the conclusion 
that the risk with the ambiguous urn is the same as choosing the 
risky urn is the following gedankenexperiment. 
 As long as participants are allowed to choose any of the two 
colors and they don’t know which proportion the experimenter 
prepared in the ambiguous urn, there are equal chances for any 
proportion of reds and blacks in it. It might be the case that this 
specific urn contains 99 red and 1 black chip or the other way 
around. By choosing the color, the specific distribution might give a 
great chance to win (e.g., for red in the first case) but also a very little 
chance to win (red in the case of urn 1, with 99 black and 1 red in it). 
These distributions obviously are the most extreme, but any of the 
other distributions between those are equally possible – due to the 
fact that one lacks the knowledge about which distribution it is. In 
this way, drawing from that urn one might end up with a red or a 
black chip – equally probable, finally it is just like a coin flip. This is 
the reason why objectively both urns should be objectively evaluated 
as the same risks, and also the reason for why we used the same 
50:50 urn as the ambiguous urn in the drawings. 
 Applying our theoretical framework to the Ellsberg-Paradox, we 
wanted to determine the extent to which this paradox was driven by 
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immediate versus anticipated emotions. How does the choice between 
a known risk and an unknown risk, or ambiguity, translate into 
emotions and subjective probability. Through which channel does 
ambiguity aversion translate to the behavior of average participants? 
Additionally, we also wanted to find out about participants’ ability to 
anticipate emotions by comparing anticipated emotions with 
emotions evoked when consequences were unveiled. 
2.5.1. Method 
 Participants. 108 students, mostly undergraduates attending 
various lectures at Cornell University, were invited to take part in a 
study on decision. With 44 females (40.7%) and 64 males (59.3%) 
aged 18 to 28 years (M=20.07), Ellsberg’s (1961) classic experiment 
was conducted. 
 Material and procedures. Participants were told that they 
might win $5 in the upcoming experiment, then they received 
envelopes containing the password procedure and first 
questionnaires. They faced exactly the situation we asked you to 
imagine before, with the same question wording. 
 Participants’ immediate emotional states regarding the choice 
of either the ambiguous urn 1 (unknown proportion of chips) or 
unambiguous urn 2 (50 black and 50 red chips), as well as the four 
anticipated emotional states connected to the possible outcomes, 
were measured. Again, we asked participants’ individual views on the 
subjective probability of winning for each of the urns on a 7-point 
scale reaching from “not probable at all” to “highly probable”. We 
counterbalanced the order of presenting the ambiguous and 
unambiguous urn as well as the color of choice. 
 After all participants made their decision, first questionnaires 
were collected and the drawing was conducted right in front of the 
group by a blindfolded volunteer. First the drawing from the 50:50 
urn took place. After that, those who had chosen this urn knew if 
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they had won. After a short explanation as to why the same urn was 
used for the second drawing, a second volunteer drew from this, then 
denoted ambiguous urn. After that, the participants who chose the 
ambiguous urn knew if they had won. 
 This procedure was followed by handing out a second 
questionnaire, which asked for an indication of the perceived 
emotions now that the outcome was known. This is a measure of the 
perceived actual emotional state connected to the real outcome. The 
session was then finished by a debriefing (giving theoretical 
background information) and the payment of $5 to those who won. 
2.5.2. Results and Discussion 
72 (66.7%) participants chose to bet on the unambiguous urn and 36 
(33.3%) decided for the ambiguous urn (p<.001). These results 
replicated common findings (Camerer and Weber, 1992) that the clear 
bet is preferred over the vague bet. 
 We ask how the average preference for known risks over 
unknown risks might reflect and be explained by considering 
emotions, especially immediate emotions connected to the actual 
choice of either the ambiguous or unambiguous alternative. Table 6 
(p.47) shows the results of a binary-logistic regression divided into 
four models predicting the choice for the known risk option vs. the 
ambiguous option. 
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Effects of Membership of the numbered Cluster relative to the Membership of the last Cluster for all six Situations. 
                    
   
Model 1 Model 2 
Anticipated emotions 
Model 3 
Immediate emotions 
Model 4 
All predictors 
Variable     
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
anticipated emotions          
 ambiguity and losing Cluster 3         
  Cluster 1   1.18* 3.26  1.37* 3.93 
  Cluster 2   - .31  .73  - .27  .76 
 ambiguity and winning Cluster 3        
  Cluster 1   1.96** 7.06   1.57 4.82 
  Cluster 2   1.12 3.08    .81 2.24 
 known risk and losing Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1    .93 2.53   .86 2.35 
 known risk and winning Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1   1.14* 3.13   .87 2.39 
immediate emotions                   
 ambiguity Cluster 2         
  Cluster 1     1.07** 2.93  .99* 2.69 
 known risk Cluster 4         
  Cluster 1      .52 1.68 1.05 2.86 
  Cluster 2      .43 1.53  .75 2.12 
  Cluster 3      .49 1.63  .83 2.29 
 difference in sub. prob.   -1.62***  .2 -1.67***  .19 -1.51***  .22 -1.48***  .23 
 order of measurement  1.27* 3.56 1.26* 3.52 1.17* 3.22 1.31* 3.71 
 sub. prob. * order  1.09* 2.97 1.06* 2.9 1.08* 2.96  .96 2.62 
 constant  - .8  .45 -3.19  .04 -1.51  .22 -3.89  .02 
Nagelkerke's R      .26   .39   .31   .43  
Significant effect on the decision to choose the unambiguous urn 2: *p < .10  **p< .05 ***p < .005          
∆R Model 1 to Model 2 sig. (p<.027), ∆R Model 1 to Model 3 n.s. (p<.16), ∆R Model 3 to Model 4 marg. sig. (p<.057) 
Table 6: Study 4: Summary of Binary-logistic Regression Analysis for Clusters of Emotional States within Immediate and Anticipated and 
Scenarios Predicting Decision to Bet on Unambiguous Urn 2 vs. Ambiguous Urn 1. 
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 Although not previously mentioned in this study, we altered the 
measurement of subjective probability between the beginning of the 
questionnaire (before the decision was made) and the end of it (after 
the decision). The latter measure was significantly connected to the 
actual decision (p<.001). For this reason, we controlled for such 
effects in all regressions by adding the order of measurement as well 
as its interaction with the measure. In all models, the control 
variables gained no significant change in explained variance when 
added. Its contribution to Nagelkerke’s R decreased from when added 
to the simplest model of solely subjective probability (Nagelkerke’s 
R²= .056, n.s.) to an increase of .034 (n.s.) when added to the 
comprehensive model containing subjective probability and both 
types of emotions. So how does subjective probability controlled for 
measurement effects affect the decision to choose a known or an 
unknown risk? 
 Subjective probability as a predictor. Model 1 introduces the 
difference in subjective probability that every participant indicated by 
answering her personal chance of winning for both alternatives. The 
difference was composed by subtracting the subjective probability to 
win choosing the ambiguous urn versus the unambiguous one. 
Hence, higher positive values mean a larger subjective probability to 
win with the ambiguous urn, lower negative values mean a larger 
subjective probability to win with the unambiguous one. The negative 
coefficient  =-1.62 in the first regression model shows that with one 
unit increasing subjective winning chances attached to ambiguous 
urn 1, consequently the odds of choosing the known risk option (urn 
2) vs. ambiguous urn 1 decrease with a factor of 1/5 ( e = .20, 
p<.005). This effect of a one unit change is so large because, in this 
case, the change on the scale already yields about one standard 
deviation of that value (SD=1.02). The difference in subjective 
probability gains substantial predictive power (Nagelkerke’s R²=.26, 
together with the control variables).  
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 Anticipated emotions as predictors. Model 2 then adds 
anticipated emotions as predictors for the decision, simultaneously 
controlling for influences of subjective probability. The increase in 
predictive power is significant (Nagelkerke’s R²=.14, p<.03). When 
only anticipated emotions attached to the outcomes are taken into 
account, several emotional contents of the scenarios affect the 
decision. But as Table 6 (p.47) reveals, most of these influences 
vanish when immediate emotions are allowed for simultaneously. 
Only the emotional states connected to one scenario – choosing the 
ambiguous urn and losing – gain influence in the comprehensive 
Model 4. Interestingly enough if only anticipated emotions connected 
to the outcomes would have been considered their role would have 
been overestimated.  
 Immediate emotions as predictors. So, before interpreting 
the effect of one anticipated scenario in detail, let us first have a look 
on the immediate emotions in model 3: the emotions connected to the 
act of choosing the ambiguous urn 1 gain significant effect ( e = 2.93, 
p<.05) on the decision despite the strong effect ( e =.22, p<.005) of 
subjective probability. This effect stays stable in the comprehensive 
Model 4, as represented by the following detailed description. 
 Immediate and anticipated emotions as predictors. Model 
4 now includes both types of emotion measures (immediate and 
anticipated) as well as subjective probability. Relevant anticipated 
emotions show up for the situation of choosing the unknown risk and 
losing. Being a member of emotional cluster 1 (‘confused, 
embarrassed’) and not of cluster 3 (‘wondering, undismayed’) 
increases the odds ratio of choosing the unambiguous urn vs. the 
ambiguous urn ( e =3.93, p<.077). 
 Cluster 1 might be interpreted as strong regret in the case of 
choosing the unknown risk and losing. Consequently 27 out of 34 
(79.4%) participants grouped in this cluster chose the unambiguous 
urn. Only 22 out of 38 (57.9%) did so in the ‘wondering cluster’. The 
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latter cluster obviously captures those who are, on average, light 
hearted in this situation, and thus are more able to check out a 
different, more vague choice. Interestingly, those going for the known 
risk rated the valence for any anticipated losing scenario lower, the 
arousal higher and the dominance lower than those choosing the 
ambiguous urn. 
 So, the question arises of how immediate emotions come into 
play. Beyond the influence of the anticipated emotional states, being 
a member of cluster 1 (‘shy’) and not of cluster 2 (‘curious’, 
‘surprised’, ‘tensioned’) in the immediate situation of choosing the 
ambiguous urn increases odds to chose the known risk by 169% 
( e =2.69, p<.081). Hence a large majority of 44 out of 54 participants 
(81.4%) grouped in the ‘shy cluster’ chose the unambiguous urn, but 
only 28 of those 53 (52.8%) captured in the ‘curious cluster’ did so. 
The latter group obviously contains those striving for the thrill of the 
ambiguous choice6. 
 Thus, perceiving immediate arousal when going for the 
ambiguous option does not necessarily lead to avoidance of it. In fact 
the contrary is true. This finding might show how the design of 
context in Keynes’ experiment influences decision makers. Because 
they have to choose one of the urns, they do not have money in their 
hands to lose, so going for the vague option might somehow be used 
as an option to gain fun or thrill just from the decision itself. 
 A clarifying insight might be given by participants’ comments: “I 
was originally going to choose urn 2 [unambiguous], but changed my 
mind at the end, realizing that both still lied on the 50/50 chance of 
which color I choose and that urn 1 [ambiguous urn] just seemed 
more exciting and with the same amount of risk involved.” B.t.w this 
is one of the uncommon cases where reasoning led to the right 
                                                 
6  The interaction of the between-subjects factor (decision) and the within-
subject factor (values of three dimensions within all six measured situations) is 
significant for the dimensions of arousal (p=.033) and dominance (p <.001) and only 
very weakly significant (p=.128) on the dimension of valence. 
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analysis. Others formulated it more straightforwardly: “I decided to go 
for the bigger chance of excitement” or even, “Going with something 
that is unknown might turn out to be a pleasantly surprising.”  
 The source of this possible pleasure is to be found in the 
incomplete information of the distribution of chips compared to the 
unambiguous urn. Interestingly, it is this lack of information which 
makes others feel uncomfortable betting on the ambiguous urn: 
“…more certain information seems to be better.” or “With urn 1 
[ambiguous] I have no idea which is scary/unpredictable.” This might 
point to an analysis of relevant personality traits – which were 
collected – but would go beyond the scope of this article. 
 Interrelation of immediate and anticipated emotions. 
Recall that cluster memberships for the described relevant 
anticipated and immediate emotions are independent of each other 
( =.013, p<.99). This confirms that immediate emotions are not just 
mirrors of anticipated emotional states. The fact that the effects of 
anticipated emotions on the decision are reduced when immediate 
emotions are considered, points to latent connections between both 
types of emotions. But, if anticipated emotions were the better 
predictors of the decision, in the sense that they carried the core of 
emotional information which triggers the immediate emotions, the 
effects of the latter would not have survived in the comprehensive 
Model 4. On the contrary, then the effects of anticipated emotions 
would have been strengthened, which was not the case. 
 Interrelation of subjective probability and emotions. Do 
emotions, at least in part, explain the connection between subjective 
probability and the decision to bet? In Study 2, this was not the case. 
Do anticipated or immediate emotions serve as a mediator between 
the chance to win and the decision to take a known or an unknown 
risk? A multinomial regression, with the cluster-membership in the 
relevant immediate scenario of taking the ambiguous risk as the 
dependent and the difference between both subjective probabilities 
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connected to both alternatives as the independent variable, reveals 
that a significant (p<.02) connection exists (Nagelkerke’s R²=.076). It 
can be said that, the higher the chance to win with the unambiguous 
urn and the lower the chance to win with the ambiguous urn (the 
difference increases) is believed, the chance to be grouped in cluster 1 
(‘shy’) increases ( =.30). The same procedure with the anticipated 
emotions for the scenario of betting on the ambiguous urn and losing 
shows no significant (p<.6) connection to the measure of subjective 
probability in a non-significant model (Nagelkerke’s R²=.013),  =.26. 
 Still the question remains, do emotions mediate subjective 
probability in the case of the Ellsberg-Paradox. A mediation analysis 
similar to the one in Study 3 reveals the following: using both the 
decision affecting emotions, an indirect effect is found via the 
immediate emotions to choose the ambiguous urn. The effect size, 
measured as index of mediation (Preacher and Hayes, 2008b), yielded 
an effect of .043 (lower level 95% confidence interval = .013, upper 
level 95% confidence interval = .371). Following MacKinnon and 
Dywer (1993) and Sobel (1982), the indirect effect size measured as 
the proportion of the total effect that is mediated yielded 4.62%. Note 
that such a specific indirect effect could only be found along the 
immediate but not with anticipated emotions. 
 Interrelation of both immediate emotions. As shown 
consistently before, the immediate emotions connected to the option 
of to taking an unknown risk are not just the opposite of those 
connected to taking a known risk ( =.09, p<.83). So this 
independence holds true for this problem of deciding between a 
known and an unknown risk as well. 
 The idea of anticipated emotional states influencing decision 
requires the ability to predict these reactions to outcomes to a more 
or less exact degree. 
 Anticipated vs. experienced outcomes. As said above in this 
study, participants indicated their perceived emotions when they 
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learned about the actual real outcome. This enables us to compare 
these perceived emotional states with those they anticipated before. If 
predictions would not fulfill a level of certainty, these beliefs would 
just be illusions and hence lead to wrong decisions made on the 
wrong basis. 
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Figure 5: Study 4. Averaged values of emotional dimensions of anticipated emotions versus experienced emotions for all four event groups 
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 As shown in Figure 5 (p.54), participants were well able to 
predict their average emotional states regarding the outcomes. Bars 
show the average values of each of the three dimensions (valence, 
arousal and dominance) for every event group. A total of 25 
participants chose the ambiguous urn and failed to win, the 
comparison of what they anticipated and what they actually indicated 
after learning about their outcome (experienced emotions) reveals no 
significant differences. In the group that decided to chose the 
ambiguous option and won $5, this is also true for the dimensions of 
valence and dominance, but not for arousal. Participants facing this 
situation overestimated their arousal in the future (t(19)=3.68, 
p=.002, all tests are paired t-test). 
 In addition, the case of ‘choosing unambiguous urn 2 and 
winning nothing’ was experienced by 43 participants. There was a 
significant difference (t(42)=2.17, p=.036) between average predicted 
and actual arousal connected to this outcome, overestimating future 
arousal. A marginal difference was found for the valence dimension 
(t(42)=-1.75, p=.09), underestimating this value for the future just a 
bit. So, at the end, these participants feel better and less aroused 
than expected, which might be the result of a coping strategy to 
handle this event. 
 The situation of taking the unambiguous risk with the 
unambiguous urn 2 and winning came true for 44 participants. They 
only slightly overestimated their future arousal connected to that 
outcome (t(43)=1.85, p=.07). For all possible situations, arousal was 
more or less overestimated, which might reflect the feelings of 
surprise people incorporate when comparing the possibility of a prize 
or a loss. 
  This effect might be called surprisingness of options, 
comparable to the findings by Mellers, Ritov and Schwartz (1999) or 
Mellers (2000). Or it simply reflects the finding that people tend to 
adapt instantly to changes in conditions (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue 
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and Rabin, 2003). Note that our results regarding the comparison of 
anticipated and experienced emotions are not comparable to those of 
Van Winden, Krawczyk and Hopfensitz (2008) because they measured 
anticipated emotions after the risky decision was made (and not 
before), and they focused on the effect of delayed risk resolution. 
 Despite the small failure in predicting the states of arousal 
connected to the revealed outcomes participants' predictions were 
strikingly accurate. Nevertheless, only one of these correct 
anticipations (the scenario of choosing the ambiguous urn and losing) 
affected the decision. Furthermore, the anticipations for winning with 
the one or the other urn look quite similar overall, participants 
anticipated feeling good in either case. Such similarity also can be 
found for the anticipations regarding both scenarios of losing. This is 
another hint that for decisions between a known and an unknown 
risk, anticipated emotions might not act as a useful guide. 
2.5.3. Summary of Study 4 
In summary, Study 4 showed that the difference in subjective 
probability between the two options gains strong influence on the 
decision. Beyond that, anticipated emotions show that those 
anticipating strong regret when choosing the ambiguous urn and 
losing the money go for the known risk. Those choosing the 
unambiguous urn rate the valence for any anticipated losing scenario 
lower, the arousal higher and the dominance lower than those 
choosing the ambiguous urn. Whereas, those taking the ambiguous 
urn, do not predict themselves hurt that much in case of not winning 
anything. The significant, unique effect of immediate emotions 
connected to choosing the ambiguous option is two-faced. On one 
hand, it is responsible for people to be shying away from it, on the 
other hand the mixture of higher valence, and especially higher 
arousal, is form of thrill that some participants go for. 
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2.6. General Discussion 
It could be shown that the decision to take or avoid a risk is 
influenced by changes in objective or subjective probabilities. Both 
anticipated and immediate emotions substantially predict a person’s 
decision. Although weak interrelations occur, immediate emotional 
states cannot be seen as simple reflections of those anticipated, 
attached to the outcomes. Immediate emotions only partly mediate 
the relationship between anticipated emotions and the decision 
participants made. By controlling for the relationship between 
immediate and anticipated emotions, it was shown that immediate 
emotions contribute specifically to the prediction of risky decisions. 
Endogenous, subjective probabilities of outcomes substantially 
influenced the decision, but immediate as well as anticipated 
emotions gained independent influence on the decision. 
 Immediate emotions connected to keeping the money carried a 
part of the effect of exogenous changed objective chances of winning 
on the decision to bet the money as a mediator. Immediate emotions 
connected to bet on the ambiguous urn in the Ellsberg-Paradox 
carried a fraction of the effect of subjective probabilities regarding 
both alternatives on the decision to bet on a known or an unknown 
risk. Immediate emotions connected to both alternatives of a decision 
could be found to be independent of one another. Hence, immediate 
emotions for one or the other option do not follow a simple on/off 
structure in a sense that the one reflects the opposite emotional 
content of the other, but they are rather independent of one another. 
 Anticipations regarding the emotional states for the different 
outcomes in the Ellsberg-Paradox were quite exact, although did not 
gain much influence on the decision to bet on unknown or an 
unknown risk. 
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2.6.1. Are Immediate Emotions Tautological? 
One might argue that the shown strong effects of immediate 
emotional feelings are just an artifact of tautology. If people decide to 
bet, they surely indicate compatible emotional states when asked 
about them after they have made their decision. But, the participants 
were asked to indicate their feelings for both possible alternatives of 
betting and keeping the money immediately before they had to make 
their final decision. The connection of the values of valence found 
between the two possible immediate situations was weak and 
insignificant in Study 1. More importantly, the independence of 
emotional cluster memberships for both possible options was 
confirmed repeatedly. There was no evidence for a pattern of cross-
over group interrelationship for the clusters in both immediate 
scenarios for Study 2, 3 and 4. These findings of independence reflect 
the existing diversity of immediate emotions. An indication of positive 
emotions in the situation of keeping the money does not 
automatically determine the existence of a bad feeling when betting 
and vice versa. 
 The same is especially true when only concentrating on the one 
dimension of arousal. High levels of arousal connected to betting the 
money do not automatically lead to avoiding the risky option, but to 
the contrary especially motivate a substantial group of participants to 
go for it. Perhaps this is due to fact that arousal promotes the 
dissociation of automatic (immediate emotions) from deliberative 
(prediction of emotions) processes, which compete to give responses 
and in this way create inconsistency (Hochman, Glöckner, and 
Yechiam, in press). Furthermore Glöckner and Hochmann (2009) 
found that anticipatory physiological arousal was modulated by 
cognitive cues, and increased with increasing inconsistency between 
cognitive and affective cues. In Study 4, we found those participants 
choosing the ambiguous urn felt significantly more arousal in the 
immediate situation of choosing this urn, compared to the immediate 
arousal measured for going with the known risk. A finding that fits 
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the data shows that anticipatory physiological arousal is higher for 
risk seekers as compared to persons scoring high on risk aversion 
tests (Glöckner and Hochmann, 2009). 
2.6.2. Taking the Riskless Perspective in a Risky Decision 
In a sense, immediate emotions can be seen as the reliable, riskless 
aspect of a risky decision. In study 4 participants had quite similar 
predictions for the cases of winning and losing, but no specific 
predictions for either of the two urns. One way to deal with such a 
lack of information is to use immediate emotions, connected to of 
going with the known or the unknown risk, as a cue. The information 
regarding how you feel about one or the other might be quite clear. 
These emotions might base the decision more than the anticipated 
emotions. Our findings suggest that this holds true even for a simple 
condition like flipping a coin, where mere anticipations should play a 
role, according to consequentialistic thinking. 
 Consequently, an approach to capture distinct emotional states 
seems to be advisable as people obviously experience distinctive 
states, which affect the decision to bet in a sophisticated manner. It 
is not a dichotomous on/off structure of mutually exclusive binary 
good or bad feelings that determine the decision to choose the risky 
option. Such complex states cannot only be found for immediate 
emotions but also for the anticipated emotions. 
2.6.3. Emotions and Subjective Probability 
Our data showed that emotional influence on a decision is quite 
independent of our measures of subjective probability. We could 
show that the effect of changing objective probabilities of winning on 
the decision was partly mediated by immediate emotions. Effects of 
the differences in the subjective probabilities, regarding both urns, on 
the decision were partly mediated by immediate emotions in the 
Ellsberg-Paradox. 
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 In none of the four studies was subjective probability measured 
simultaneously when objective probabilities were changed. Hence, it 
is unclear how emotions influence the process of translating changes 
of objective chances to changes in subjective probabilities. Especially 
the strong risk-aversion and/or loss-aversion seen in the lower 
chance conditions (1/6, 2/6) compared to the better chances 
conditions in Study 3 reflect the well-known finding that probabilities 
are not perceived linearly. 
  We were not able to analyze whether these deviations can be 
explained by emotional influences. By controlling for the endogenous 
variable of subjective probabilities in the regression models in Studies 
2 and 4, we focused on the additional, unique influence of emotions 
on the decision. Therefore, the influence of emotions might still be 
underestimated in our approach. Future analyses might show that 
emotions already contribute to the process of forming objective to 
subjective probability. This question remains open for further 
research. 
2.6.4. Risk-as-Feelings and Affect-as-Information 
Due to the rather unclear differentiation between both theories, 
provided by their inventors, it is difficult to form specific statements 
about the different predictions based on their different assumptions 
regarding the processes by which affect comes into play. As far as we 
understand, for the affect-as-information approach, affect is always 
derived from the special features of the object being evaluated. For 
example, when thinking about the risks of building an atomic power 
plant, the risk perception is influenced by the emotions attached to 
the power plant. This affect changes as the risk perception changes, 
which only can be derived from anticipations. These changes are then 
reflected in the evaluation of the risk now (i.e., anticipatory affect). In 
this sense the risk-as-feelings theory is more specific than the risk-
as-feelings approach: affect is changed only by emotions raised by the 
features of the anticipated object. Consequently, this means that 
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immediate emotions must always mirror these anticipations and are 
not independent of each other. The Risk-as-feelings theory, on the 
contrary, opens the underlying processes to other emotions from 
other sources and especially to those, which are raised from the 
process of deciding itself. Our data shows that immediate and 
anticipated emotions are independent of or very weakly connected to 
each other. This means that immediate emotions act quite 
independently from anticipated emotional states, as hypothesized by 
Loewenstein et al. (2001). 
2.6.5. Anticipating Emotions 
As shown in Study 4, participants were able to anticipate the 
emotional states they would experience when confronted with the 
consequences of their decision. At first sight, this contradicts the 
findings of Van Boven, Loewenstein, Dunning (2005), but they 
assumed the influence of arousal on behavior, which cannot be 
anticipated. In this sense, they focused on if people are able to 
anticipate their immediate reactions to a behavior in a high arousal 
situation (i.e., singing a song in front of the audience). This setting is 
different to the decision problems analyzed in our studies in several 
respects. First, the duty to sing a song in front of your study 
colleagues surely is more embarrassing than losing $5 in a lottery. 
Secondly, revealing the outcome of a lottery was not connected to do 
anything embarrassing in the public’s eye – like, for example, going to 
the front of the class and carrying a sign lettered “LOSER”. In this 
sense, our results are not directly comparable to those studies. We 
argue that participants in our experiments are already in a kind of 
‘hot’ state when making their predictions regarding emotional 
reactions to the outcomes. With our measurements of emotions, we 
encouraged them to go through all the possibilities that might 
happen and fully engage in the decision. In this sense, they might not 
predict a ‘hot’ situation on the basis of a ‘cold’ state. 
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 In Study 4, for both losing scenarios, participants 
overestimated their arousal slightly but not substantially, a hint that 
people instantly began to adopt the negative event. Despite this, 
overall, participants were strikingly exact in their predictions. This 
contradicts findings by Gilbert and colleagues (Wilson and Gilbert, 
2005), as their studies showed that people tend to overestimate the 
intensity and duration of emotional reactions to future positive and 
negative events. We cannot say anything about duration because 
there was no second point in time when emotions regarding the 
outcome were measured in this study.  
 As shown in Study 3, participants who anticipated strong 
disappointment in the case of keeping the money and learning that 
they would have won were prone to take the risk. Anticipated 
emotions in this sense worked against loss aversion, which came into 
play by the direct effects of objective probability on the one hand, and 
beyond this by the immediate emotions regarding keeping the money. 
The group clustered as feeling relaxed is really to distinguish from 
those who are labeled as ‘uninterested’ when keeping the money. 
Therefore, loss aversion partly seems to take effect through 
immediate emotions and not only through anticipated reactions. 
Regarding the source of loss-aversion, this contradicts findings of 
Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, and Gilbert (2006). 
 In Study 4, the impact of winning something was rated with a 
much higher impact than losing the money on all three dimensions of 
valence, arousal, and dominance. This finding might not be used to 
attract more critics on loss-aversion, as an affective forecasting error 
because in the Ellsberg-Paradox participants have to choose between 
both urns, so they have to bet their money anyway. This makes the 
ratings of emotional reactions to a loss incomparable to the situation 
where the participant is allowed to take the money and deny the risk. 
This question will be addressed in our future research. 
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 Overall, our finding that participants are able to predict the 
future pleasure and pain of outcomes, but only partly use these cues 
for the decision, are extremely incompatible with the common, 
rational-choice utility-based perspective, in which participants show 
different individual utility-functions due to the fact that some bet and 
some do not. However, these differing functions do not mirror in 
differing anticipations. Those participants who did bet had precisely 
imagined the outcome of the situation as well as those who decided to 
keep the money. There was no positively-dyed illusion moderating the 
bad feelings arising in the situation of losing the money, which might 
have led those who bet. 
2.6.6. Immediacy of Outcomes 
All mentioned experiments took about 30 to 40 minutes, including 
answering the questionnaires and any lottery procedure. In Studies 1 
to 3, the payments took place at the end of the lecture (about one 
hour later). In Study 4, through a special collection procedure of the 
envelopes that assured the anonymity of the decision, the money was 
paid to the winners immediately after the session. These very short 
gaps between the actual decision and receiving the outcome make it 
hard to believe that time discounting changed prospects and 
therefore influenced decisions. 
2.7. Conclusion 
To our knowledge, this is the first series of studies that examined the 
relative role and relative importance of immediate and anticipated 
emotions in simple risky decisions. This is in contrast to other 
findings, which have not focused on actual decision-making using 
self-reports and did not implement a physio-psychological measure 
like the SAM (Kobbeltved et. al, 2005). A clear direct effect of 
immediate emotions on actual decisions could be found. Also 
anticipated emotions affect the decisions. 
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 Finally, it must be said that in the specific site of experimental 
examination of decision-making under risk and uncertainty (which 
definitely resides outside the dance floor), people tend to follow Irene 
Cara’s vocalized strategy: 
 ‘Take your passion and make it happen’. 
What a feelin’! 
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3. Trust – Just another bet? 
The risk-as-feelings hypothesis argues that many risky decisions are 
not only predicted by anticipated emotions, as most 
consequentialistic decision-making theories would assume, but that 
they are influenced also by immediate emotions. Immediate emotions 
refer to the emotions experienced at the very moment the actual 
decision is made, contrary to the anticipated emotions imagined 
regarding the possible consequences of a decision. This study focuses 
on the role of both types of emotions in the decision-making process 
under risk in social and non-social contexts. Accordingly, 
participants had to indicate their emotional states regarding the 
anticipated outcomes in a (non-social) simple coin flip, and in 
situations incorporating social dependencies: an Extended Coin Flip 
implying monetary consequences for another person and a situation 
of trusting an anonymous Person (Trust Game). In all three 
conditions, subjects also indicated their immediate emotions at the 
moment of making the decision. 
3.1. Introduction 
3.1.1. Dual System Model.  
First, an experiential “System 1” describing the processes of thinking, 
which are fast, automatic, effortless, associative, difficult to control or 
modify and emotional. Second, an analytic system “System 2” 
containing the processes of thinking that were described as slow, 
serial, effortful, controllable, consciously accessible and neutral 
(Kahnemann, 2003; Stanovich and West, 2000). Only recently has 
this dichotomous view been softened (Beachara and Damasio, 2005; 
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio, 1997). In addition, today it 
can be said that decision-making without emotional involvement 
might be far from optimal or not even possible (Damasio, 1994). 
66 
3.1.2. Consequentialistic Thinking. 
Using this distinction as a starting premise, Loewenstein and others 
applied it to the field of decision making by focusing on the intuitive 
System 1 with their Risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 
2001). Until then, consequentialistic approaches in form of 
(subjective) expected-utility theories were clearly dominant in that 
field. Such theories presume that decisions are predictable in a way 
that people think about the likelihood and severity of consequences of 
all possible alternatives and translate that information by some 
calculation process into their actual choice (Loewenstein et al., 2001). 
This calculation process might be biased or include errors (bounded 
rationality, heuristics), but at least this process is assumed to be a 
process of the analytic System 2. So, for a long time, theorists acted 
as though intuitive processes played no role in decision making - that 
people chose to take risks (or not) based on the cold calculation of 
expectations (beliefs). In addition, that this should not only hold true 
for decisions without consequences for others (e.g., to flip a coin to 
win some money) but also for behavior which directly effects the 
outcomes of other persons (e.g., trust). 
3.1.3. Risk-as-Feelings 
The risk-as-feelings theory emphasizes the role that is played by 
emotions when people make decisions. It suggests, “that feelings play 
a much more prominent role in risky decision making than they are 
given credit for by the cognitive-consequentiality tradition of J/DM 
[judgment and decision-making] research” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, 
p. 274). The basis for this statement is formed by the findings of sub-
fields of psychology, which basically filtered out different 
determinants for the perception of risk related to System 1 or System 
2. Probability and expected outcomes do influence cognitive 
evaluations of risk (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). Emotional 
reactions to risk are sensitive to the vividness of the imagined 
situation (Finucane, M. L., Alhakami, A., Slovic, P., and Johnson, S. 
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M. (2000), Slovic, Finucane, Peters, McGregor, 2004; Slovic and 
Peters, McGregor, Finucane, 2005), the time gap until consequences 
take effect (Loewenstein, 1996), and other variables that only 
minimally effect cognitive evaluation (e.g. surprisingness of an 
outcome, (Haselhuhn, Mellers, 2005; Mellers, McGraw, 2001; Mellers, 
2000; Mellers, Ritov, Schwarz, 1999)). 
 The risk-as-feelings theory proposes “a distinction between 
anticipatory emotions and anticipated emotions. Anticipatory 
emotions are immediate visceral reactions (e.g., fear, anxiety, dread) 
to risks and uncertainties. Anticipated emotions are typically not 
experienced in the immediate present but are expected to be 
experienced in the future” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p. 267). 
Anticipated emotions are the answer to the appropriate question 
“How will you feel when decision for alternative X leads to 
consequence Y?” Such anticipations become salient through 
deliberative thought about the object of outcome and hence must be 
seen more on the side of System 2. In contrast to this 
consequentialistic view, Loewenstein et al. centre on anticipatory (or 
immediate) emotions as “gut feelings experienced at the moment of 
making a decision, which are often quite independent of the 
consequences of the decision” and suggest that they “can play a 
critical role in the choice one eventually makes” (Loewenstein et al., 
2001, p. 281). Such emotions should be counted more to the intuitive 
System 1 processes as unaware underpinnings of a behavior. The 
appropriate question for immediate emotions reads, “How do you feel 
in the moment of choosing alternative X?” Following this 
differentiation, our approach is not consequentialistic; it is an 
attempt to provide more insight on how immediate emotions come 
into play and how much explanatory power they gain. We also 
examine if and how immediate emotions are connected to the 
anticipated emotions attached to outcomes. Finally, we investigate if 
and how both types of emotions can explain decisions in a social and 
a non-social context. 
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3.1.4. Social and Non-Social Risky Decisions. 
To find out how emotions influence such choices an experiment with 
three different conditions was carried out where participants could 
either lose (0€) or double (10€) an amount of money they received 
before (€5): 1) A simple coin flip as the very basic form of a risky 
decision. 2) A socially extended version of a coin flip, similar to the 
design used by Fetchenhauer and Dunning (in press). If participants 
bet on a coin flip and won, they would receive €10 and another 
anonymous person would also get €10. If they lost, participants had 
to return their €5 and this anonymous person would get €20. The 
idea of the design is to make the decision to bet on the coin relevant 
for another person. It could be the case that altruistic motives are at 
work in this situation - in a sense that people follow the logic of 
“enlarging the pie” (Becker, 1974; Coate, 1995) hence, are less 
focused on their personal pay-off compared to a simple coin flip. 3) As 
explained in the following section, participants faced the situation of 
the so-called Trust Game in the role of a person (trustor) who has to 
decide to trust an anonymous person (trustee) or not. 
3.1.5. Social vs. Risky Decisions. 
Especially in situations involving other people, decision-making 
under risk and uncertainty might be less based on reasoning as 
suggested by different critiques of the consequentialists’ view on 
judgement and decision-making (Loewenstein et al., 2001). Such 
situations might be more similar to moral judgements as defined by 
David Hume: “They are derived from sentiment, not reason, and we 
attain moral knowledge by an ‘immediate feeling and finer internal 
sense,’ not by a ‘chain of argument and induction’.” (Hume, 
1777/1960, in Haidt, 2001, p. 2). This idea may lead to an 
explanation that might solve the problems that expected-utility-based 
models face when they predict decisions with social dependencies by 
assuming the character of common risky choices. 
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 As described extensively later in this article, Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (in press, 2005) showed that, especially behavior in Trust 
Games does not follow the traditional model. The willingness to 
accept the vulnerability of being exploited constitutes in subject’s 
behavior, but not in their beliefs. This opens the field to integrate 
emotions as a channel through which decisions in social and non-
social risky situations are causally influenced. 
3.1.6. How to Measure Trust Behavior? 
In classical game theory, trust is analyzed as a risky option or 
decision under uncertainty – hence trust from this perspective is just 
another bet. To examine such decisions under a controlled 
environment, an instrument for measuring trust is needed. Starting 
in the 1980s (Rosenthal, 1982) and especially in the 1990s (Kreps, 
1990; Berg, Dickhaut, McCabe, 1995), behavioral economists 
developed a behavioral measure of trust, which was ideal for the 
laboratory setting: the Trust Game. A variant of this game used in the 
present study is briefly described here.  
 It is played by two persons. Person A moves first, and 
depending on this Person B then makes the second move. Persons A 
(the trustors) receive an amount of X (e.g., €5) from the experimenter. 
Person A then has two options: to keep all of the money or to give it 
completely to Person B (trustee). If Person A keeps the money, the 
game is over. If Person A gives the money to Person B (via the 
experimenter), this Person B additionally receives the tripled amount 
of X (3X, e.g., €15) from the experimenter. So Person B then has a 
total of 4X (Person’s A sent X + 3X sent by the experimenter, i.e., €20 
in total) as well as two options: to keep the entire amount or to split it 
equally with Person A so that both are left with 2X (4X divided by 2, 
e.g., €10 for each). The willingness to trust is then measured as the 
proportion of Persons A who are willing to send the money to the 
trustee. In an analogous way, Persons’ B trustworthiness equals the 
proportion of trustees splitting the money. 
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 Uncertainty in this case, for Person A is represented by the 
behavior of Person B, which is directly connected to the chance for 
Person A to double (2X, e.g., €10) or lose the endowment (X, e.g., €5). 
In a variant of the game, uncertainty regarding Persons’ B behaviors 
can be changed into risk by stating what percentage of the group of 
the responders acted trustworthy. So, for a given rate of 
trustworthiness of (e.g., 50%) the rational chooser should be 
indifferent due to the fact that the expected values are equal for 
keeping (1X=€5) or trusting (0.5*0X+0.5*2X=1X=€5). However, as 
empirical findings (prospect-theory by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 
show in this area of probability, people in various lotteries tend to 
choose the riskless option and keep the sure €5. In this sense, the 
result of a process of guessing chances and possible outcomes is 
deduced from behavior. This approach is based upon a 
consequentialistic perspective for Person A’s process of deciding: 
Taking into account the possible consequences and (subjective) 
estimations of the linked chances of incidence leads to the 
corresponding behavior. 
 Following a long philosophical tradition beginning with 
Socrates and Plato and continued by Machiavelli and Hobbes (Baier, 
1986), no one should trust a person as long as one has no reason to 
do so. In these definitions, one party (the trustor) should only trust 
another (trustee), if the trustee has a material self-interest not to 
abuse the trust he received from the trustor. This self-interest to 
reciprocate is equivalent to a return the trustee will receive in future 
transactions from the trustor (e.g., “loyalty rebate”). Alternatively, this 
could be a benefit from not suffering punishment through a third 
instance (e.g., law, social norms). Only under this condition has a 
trustor reason to trust, because due to sure reciprocation it is 
guaranteed that potential gain is higher than potential loss, which in 
sum equates to a positive expected utility (Coleman, 1990). This 
paradigm is based on the assumptions of rationality, self-interest, 
and common knowledge (everybody knows that everybody knows that 
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everyone follows his self-interest). As said before for such situations 
classical game theory assumes the same cognitive process of building 
expectations as in other common risky decisions (e.g., in a lottery). 
 However, the special situation of trust has to be shown as a 
good example for a decision-making problem where the cognitive 
understanding of the situation in terms of probabilities and outcomes 
heavily contradicts actual behavior, as reviewed in the following 
section. 
3.2. Why Do They Trust? 
In the following, a spectrum of possible explanations is reviewed for 
the fact that in general a majority of people acting as a trustor place 
their trust in Person B. Persons A generally tend to trust at 
substantial rates ranging from 30% up to 95% where they should 
never trust expecting the selfish behavior of a trustee (e.g. Eckel and 
Wilson, 2001, 2004a; Fetchenhauer and Dunning, 2005). This holds 
true for games where trustors’ identities are not known to the trustee 
and the experimenter and the choices made totally anonymous in 
games played with double-blind condition. These explanations all 
share their origin in the consequentialistic tradition mentioned above. 
 One causation for the trusting behavior of Persons A seems to 
suggest itself: Persons A’s proneness to trust might rely on their 
intuitive knowledge of Persons B acting in a trustworthy manner in 
general. This intuition should then precipitate on positive 
expectations Persons A have regarding the trustworthiness of Persons 
B. 
 Taking positive expectations as a main predictor for decisions 
to trust and a reason for excessive proneness to trust should have 
the following result: if people’s decisions to trust rely on expectations 
about the behavior of the trustee (probability) and the outcomes and 
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if trustors tend to trust, trustors obviously should tend to have 
positive expectations. Does this hold true? In a word, no. 
3.2.1. Expectations 
Subjective beliefs about others’ trustworthy behavior do have a 
significant influence on peoples’ decision to trust or not to trust 
(Fetchenhauer and Dunning, in press). Persons A, who answer more 
sceptically about their expectations of the trustworthiness of Persons 
B, significantly less often send their money to Person B (trusted). 
However, other findings challenge this result, although at first sight it 
seems clear: 
 First, people do not seem to be able to estimate actual rates of 
trustworthiness. Underestimation of the portion of Persons B acting 
in a trustworthy manner is a stable result, as shown by 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (in press). The difference between 
subjective beliefs and the actual proportion of trustworthy Persons B 
lay between 31.3 and 34.1 percentage points across the two studies. 
 Second, comparison of trustors’ actual rates of trust with their 
subjective beliefs about the trustworthiness of the trustee, taking into 
account individual tolerance of risk, shows that trustors generally 
‘trust too much’ respective to their expectations. In these studies, 
participants had to express their tolerance of risk in a lottery 
question by stating minimum needed chance of winning to bet their 
stake. Additionally, they had to estimate the percentage of Persons B 
acting trustworthily, their subjective beliefs. A comparison of these 
values for every participant leads to a value of how many participants 
rationally should have trusted in Person B. If one demanded a 
minimum chance to win of 50% in the lottery and at the same time 
estimated 60% of Persons B acting trustworthy, it was rational to 
trust. Given this calculation a minority of Persons A, only 30.6%, 
rationally should have given their money to Persons B. However, the 
actual rate of trust was 70.5% (Fetchenhauer and Dunning, in press). 
This result was confirmed by a second study of Fetchenhauer and 
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Dunning (in press) with 30.7% of participants who rationally should 
have handed their money over to Person B. A weak relationship 
between behavioral risk measures and the decision to trust was also 
confirmed by Eckel and Wilson (2004b). 
 Therefore, trustors’ expectations will simply not fit with their 
actual behavior, even taking into account individual risk preferences. 
Obviously, expectations and risk preferences only explain a small 
part of variations in trusting behavior. 
 Therefore, expectations are not a main predictor for the 
decision to trust. Alternatively, are high trusting rates caused by 
peoples’ ignorance with regard to their expectations? People may tend 
to suppress whispers of rationality because they are playing a game 
with hypothetical outcomes? Hence, one might argue that people 
surely tend to take a higher risk in their decision to trust if these 
games are with hypothetical outcomes. Hence, high trust rates might 
be just an artifact of experiments using hypothetical outcomes. Does 
this hold true? The answer is no. 
3.2.2. Hypothetical Outcomes 
In strong contrast to the gambling hypothesis, Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (in press) found that participants were even more, not less, 
likely to trust in a real than in a hypothetical situation. More reality 
was induced by playing with real money, which was earned in one 
hour of work before the experiment started. Moreover, people were 
even more willing to trust when decisions were made more real in a 
trust game, contrary to the fact that the more real circumstances in a 
lottery scenario (rationality paradigm) made them more risk-averse. 
In a more real situation, in contrast to a purely hypothetical one, 
participants’ rates of trust significantly exceeded the rate at which 
they should have trusted acting rationally (Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning, 2005, Study 2). Hence, high trust rates and trusting too 
much given pessimistic beliefs at the same time cannot be explained 
with the mentioned unreal experimental conditions. 
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3.2.3. Altruism 
Trust might be driven by altruistic motives of Person A. If I give away 
my €5 and the bad case of Person B keeping the whole amount comes 
true, at least somebody has €20 and €20 is more than my kept €5. 
So, sending the money to Person B in every case brings €20 in the 
world, either in the form of €10 for each of us if Person B acts 
trustworthily, or in the form of the €20 kept by Person B. Do 
participants really give away their money to “enlarge the pie” or 
maximize welfare selflessly for members of the group (Becker, 1974; 
Coate, 1995)? 
 This argument was also examined by Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (2005, Study 4). Like in this study, they compared a 
discrete trust game situation with two coin-flip situations, all three 
situations with the same pay-off structure. The coin-flip situation 
contained one condition with and a second condition without possible 
profit for another person. Without possible profit for another meant 
that participants just had to decide if they want to keep 5$ for 
definite or to flip a coin with a 50% chance to win 10$. With possible 
profit for another meant that the coin-flip condition without possible 
profit for another was socially extended: if participants bet on a coin 
flip and won, they would receive $10 and another person from a 
previous session of the experiment would also get $10. If they lost, 
they had to return their $5 and another Person would get $20. 
Altruistic motives are expected to be at work, if both situations 
involving another person (the trust game and the extended coin-flip 
with possible profit for another Person) show equal rates of choosing 
the risky option (trust or bet on the coin-flip) and if these rates are 
higher than in the situation just effecting benefit of Persons A (simple 
coin-flip without possible profit for another Person). 
 With a sample of psychology students at Cornell University, it 
turned out that players showed equal rates of choosing the risky 
option (betting) in both coin-flip situations – the one with possible 
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positive outcomes for another Person and the one just affecting the 
players’ own benefit (both 28%). Nevertheless, in this trust game, 
59.3% of Persons A chose to send their money to the responder. So, 
altruistic motives of welfare-maximization could not explain the 
motivation to trust in this context. 
3.2.4. Fairness 
If altruism cannot explain trusting behavior, what about another 
common social phenomenon – fairness? Perhaps the wish of Person A 
to carry on and stabilize social norms finds expression in a preference 
for equal outcomes as an applied rule of equality. This preference 
may also be expressed as an intrinsically motivated (and not 
intentional) inequity aversion, which has already explained behavior 
in other co-operative games (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Hence, 
fairness might also be a reason for choosing the risky option in the 
trust game. Does this hold true? To some extent yes, but ultimately 
no. Yes, to some extent. 
 Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2005) played a trust game with an 
endowment equality condition, meaning that Persons A were told that 
Persons B would get equal amount of money (€10) if Persons A 
decided to keep their endowment of €10 for sure. Participants taking 
part in this condition took the risky option of placing trust in Person 
B significantly less often compared to the condition where Persons B 
would receive no endowment in the case of Person A keeping the 
money. This influence could be described as self-centered fairness, 
lowering trust rates as long as Persons A know that they do not harm 
Persons B by deciding not to trust (trust rate decreases from 70.9% 
to 56.6%). 
 But the rate of trust of Persons A in the endowment equality 
condition (56.6%) still greatly exceeded the rate at which they would 
take an equivalent risk in a lottery with the same probabilities – a 
situation where inequality aversion motives are not applicable 
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(23.2%). So, Persons A still trusted too much, from the perspective of 
the classical rational-choice theory. 
 The ultimate answer is ‘no’ because preference for equal 
outcomes explains only a small part of variation of trusting behavior 
in the trust game, due to the fact that a substantial rate of about 
57% of Persons A still trusted without a chance to apply norms of 
fairness. 
 To sum up the series of experiments, Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning (in press) showed that this premise does not apply to the 
situation of trust. Despite being very skeptical about the rate of 
trustworthiness of the group of anonymous trustees (underestimating 
it about 30-35%) people tend to trust overwhelmingly. Furthermore, 
comparing the individual minimal demanded chance to win in a 
lottery with the trust behavior, given the subjective beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the beneficiaries, revealed that only a minority on 
about 30% should have trusted given rational standards. In this 
sense, people are risk-averse when the situation is framed as an 
ordinary lottery (coin flip) and risk-seeking when framed as a 
situation of trust, meaning that they trust too much. This difference 
also cannot be explained with the eventually hypothetical character of 
the situation. These findings demonstrate in sum that expectations, 
unreality of the game and motives of altruism and fairness cannot 
explain the stable high trust rates found with trust games. 
 That induced (incidental) emotional states influence trust 
decisions already was shown by Dunn and Schweitzer (2005). But 
this study takes a different approach as suggested by Schlösser 
(2006) by focusing on the role of emotions arising from the decision 
itself (immediate emotions) and from those attached to the 
anticipated outcomes. How do such emotions predict the behavior of 
the decider? What role(s) do differing specific emotions play when 
deciding under risk in situations with (Trust Game, Extended Coin 
Flip) and without social dependencies (simple coin flip). Furthermore, 
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we show that not only anticipated emotions attached to the outcomes 
influence decisions, but that (immediate) emotions emerging from the 
decision problem itself take strong effect on actual behavior. In order 
to conceptualize that differentiation our attempt is an 
operationalization of the Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et 
al., 2001). 
 Up to now, immediate emotions were merely objects of 
research; we do not have a specific theory about their content. 
However, it seems to be reasonable that these contents may vary 
depending on situation and individual differences. However, it also 
seems to be reasonable to hypothesize that if these variations exist 
they should influence decisions. Therefore, with respect to the 
emotional content the following studies are explorative. 
3.2.5. Predictions  
We want to elucidate the role anticipated and immediate emotions 
play when choosing risky options with and without social 
dependency. Therefore, we ask several questions. On a bivariate level, 
first we analyze to what extend the decision to take or avoid a risk 
was directly influenced by the change in situation (coin flip, Extended 
Coin Flip, Trust Game)? Then we ask, how were anticipated and 
immediate emotions connected to the decision? How did both of them 
differ regarding the type of situation? Were differences in occurrence 
of specific emotions in the situations responsible for changes in 
behavior? For example, were people prone to trust more than 
gambling because of emotions specific to trust? 
 With a binary-logistic regression analysis then we ask to what 
extend both types of emotions independently and together have 
predictive power for the decision to take a risk. To enrich our findings 
and understand the results of the regressions better, we then ask 
how emotions were related to each other - are immediate emotions 
only reflections of anticipated emotions or do they independently and 
substantially change decisions? How anticipated emotional states 
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relate to each other dependent of being anticipated in a social or non-
social context? Are immediate emotions connected to take a risk can 
be said to be mirrors of those perceived when going with the save 
option? We then ask the question if emotions potentially mediate the 
effect of changes of the situation to changes in decisions. Finally, we 
ask if effects of anticipated emotions are the result of rather exact 
anticipations or biased illusions. 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Participants 
Visitors of a lecture at the University of Cologne in Germany (n=189, 
64 male, 125 female) took part in the study. All participants were 
between the ages 21 and 56 (M=24.76, SD=3.25). Most of them 
studied business administration (70.3%), some economics, or social 
sciences (12.1%), the rest other majors.  
3.3.2. Material and Procedures 
Participants were assigned to one of three experimental conditions: 
the coin flip (64), the Extended Coin Flip (66) and the Trust Game 
(59). The experiment was split into two sessions. In the first session, 
all participants received an envelope containing the questionnaire 
with €5 and had to decide to keep or risk the money to eventually 
double the amount to €10. In a second session, one-week later 
individual outcomes were revealed. In the meantime, the coin flip was 
conducted and videotaped to be shown in the second session. 
 In both coin flip conditions, participants faced the risky option 
to eventually double their €5, with a 50%, chance of losing it and 
leaving with €0. In the Trust Game due to prevent the participants 
doubt about the realness of the situation the probability to meet a 
trustworthy Person B was set to 48%. Anonymity was assured by an 
individual password. For each of the three different conditions, the 
logic of the specific situation (Trust Game, coin flip, Extended Coin 
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Flip) was described. Wording was held constant as much as possible 
in these descriptions. At this time, participants did not know that 
they would play the game themselves later on. After a few control 
questions regarding the logic of the situations, it was announced that 
they now would play the game in real life, as Person A. The 
participants then had to indicate their emotional states via the Self-
Assessment-Manikin (SAM; Lang, 1980; see Chapter 2.2.1 (p.15) for 
the description of the instrument) thinking about all four possible 
anticipated outcomes (keep & win, keep & lose, bet/trust & win, 
bet/trust & lose) with the following verbalization of the situations. 
Accordingly, the wording of these questions given in the three 
different conditions only differed in the necessary parts.  
 For the simple coin flip these questions read as follows: 
 Coin Flip. In this simple coin flip, participants had to decide to 
bet €5 with a 50% chance of doubling it to €10. If they lost, they 
would receive nothing.  
 1.) keep & win: “Imagine you decide today to keep the €5 and 
not to participate in the coin flip. Then, next week, you learn that you 
would have won. This means that you get a total of €5.”  
 2.) keep & lose: “Imagine you decide today to keep the €5 and 
not to participate in the coin flip. Then, next week, you learn that you 
would have lost. This means that you get a total of €5.” 
 3.) bet/trust & win: “Imagine you decide today to bet the €5. 
Then, next week you learn that you have won. This means that you 
get a total of €10.” 
 4.) bet/trust & lose: “Imagine you decide today to bet the €5. 
Then, the next week, you learn that you have lost. This means that 
you get a total of €0.” 
All scenarios ended with the question “How would do you feel in this 
situation?” In addition, each was followed by a SAM measurement. 
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 In the following section regarding immediate emotions, 
participants then were asked to concentrate on emotions they sense 
immediately before they come to their decision:  
“Now it is about the feelings you sense now, right in this moment 
immediately before you actually make your decision. So, please 
concentrate on the upcoming decision and describe the feelings 
connected to this.” 
 For both possible immediate situations of betting or keeping the 
money, participants then had to indicate their emotional state again 
via SAMs after the following questions: 
1.) “Imagine you decide now to bet the €5 on flipping the coin. How 
do you feel about this?” 
2.) “Imagine you decide now to keep the 5€ by not flipping the coin. 
How do you feel about this?” 
 After these questions, and before presenting the SAMs for each 
of the questions, the following was added: “Please fill out the following 
SAMs in any case, even if you won’t decide in this way.” 
 Then, we asked the participants to make their concrete decision 
regarding if they would like to flip the coin and, if so, tell us their 
winning side. Those not betting just kept the money they received; 
those taking the chance to double the money returned the €5 to the 
envelope. Once everybody finished, questionnaires were collected. 
One week later, we presented the result of the coin flip. 
 Extended Coin Flip. The simple coin flip was extended by 
introducing another Person, Person B, eventually receiving money as 
well, dependent on participant’s decision. Participants could decide to 
keep or bet the €5. In the case of wining the bet, not only the decider 
himself but also a randomly chosen Person B from another 
experimental group would receive €10. If the gamble was lost, this 
Person B would receive €20, the decider €0. 
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 The emotions regarding the emotions in all anticipated 
scenarios were questioned as follows. 
 1.) keep & win: “Imagine you decide today to keep the €5 and 
not to participate in the coin flip. Then, next week you learn that you 
would have won. This means, you get a total of €5 and Person B gets 
€0.” 
 2.) keep & lose: “Imagine you decide today to keep the €5 and 
not to participate in the coin flip. Then, next week you learn that you 
would have lost. This means you get a total of €5 and Person B gets 
€0.” 
 3.) bet/trust & win: “Imagine you decide today to bet the €5 in 
the coin flip. Then, next week, you learn that you have won. This 
means, you get a total of €10 and Person B gets €10.” 
 4.) bet/trust & lose: “Imagine you decide today to bet the €5 in 
the coin flip. Then, next week, you learn that you have lost. This 
means, you get a total of €0 and Person B gets €20.” 
 The introduction and questions regarding immediate emotions 
were asked the same way like in the simple coin flip condition. 
 Trust Game. Then the logic of the trust game was explained in 
principle. Then, it was announced that that Person B is drawn to 
them is allotted from another experimental group, which has already 
made its decision. Participants were told that 48% of the trustees had 
already decided to act trustworthily and 52% would not do so. As 
said before, this was due to minimize suspicion regarding the 
realness of the situation. But we would argue that this value is close 
enough to the 50% so that it should be comparable to both other 
conditions. The understanding of the possible outcomes as a 
consequence of the trusting behavior of Person A and the allotted 
Person B, as well as the grade of fixed trustworthiness (48%), was 
then tested by control questions. Afterwards the participants had to 
82 
indicate their emotional states via SAM thinking about all four 
possible anticipated outcomes: 
 1.) keep & win: “Imagine you decide today to keep the €5. Next 
week, you learn that allotted Person B would have given you €10 
back. This means, you get a total of €5 and Person B gets €0.” 
 2.) keep & lose: “Imagine you decide today to keep the €5. Next 
week, you learn that allotted Person B would have kept the full 
amount of €20 for herself. This means, you get a total of €5 and 
Person B gets a total of €0.” 
 3.) bet/trust & win: Imagine you decide today to give the €5. 
Next week, you learn that Person B decided to keep €10 for himself 
and send you €10. This means you receive a total of €10 and Person 
B receives a total of €10.” 
 4.) bet/trust & lose: Imagine you decide today to give the €5. 
Next week, you learn that Person B would have kept €20 for herself 
and send €0 to you. This means, you get a total of €0 and Person B 
gets a total of €20.” 
 For both possible immediate situations of trusting or keeping 
the money, participants then had to indicate their emotional state 
again via SAMs after the following questions to the question “How do 
you feel about this?”: 
1.) “Assume you give the 5€ you just received to Person B.” 
2.) “Assume you keep the 5€ you just received.” 
 In the second session then, one week later, all participants in 
all three conditions received an envelope with their individual 
password printed on. In that they found the description of their 
individual outcome and the respective amount of money together with 
a short questionnaire asking how they feel now with their actual 
outcome. 
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 For capturing emotional states for the anticipated outcomes 
and within the immediate alternatives to take the risk or the save 
option a specific method of measuring was used.  
 Clustering Emotional States. In this study, the similar 
method of clustering emotional states as described in Chapter 2.3.2 
(p.25) was applied. All individual emotional profiles from all emotional 
measures within the six situations (two immediate, four anticipated) 
recorded by the SAM were classified using a two-step cluster 
analysis7. This cluster process is open in number, so for different 
scenarios possibly a different number of clusters were extracted. 
 In a second step for easier handling and understanding, these 
clusters were labeled at least with one emotional term of the 
emotional dictionary (Fischer and Brauns, 1998). If more than one 
word is mentioned in the following descriptions, this happens with 
decreasing degree of specification. As stated above, our analysis of 
emotional content is explorative. The emotional labels given to 
clusters should help us to understand what is going on. We do not 
claim that every subject captured in the clusters of averaged 
emotional states feels like we describe it. However, it is an attempt to 
understand and these labels mostly make much sense in our context. 
3.4. Results and Discussion 
Over all three conditions, 102 of 189 participants decided to keep the 
money (54%). In the situation of a simple coin flip, a minority of 28% 
(18 of 64) of participants decided to bet their money on the flip of the 
coin. On the contrary, in the socially Extended Coin Flip condition, 
exactly half (33 of 66 participants) of the participants flipped the coin. 
In the Trust Game, then, the majority (36 of 59) of participants (61%) 
decided to trust an anonymous Person B. The difference between the 
risk rates in the coin flip and the Trust Game was significant 
                                                 
7 applying a log-likelihood-approximation using the Aikaike’s Information Criterion 
for goodness of fit 
84 
(p<.001), as was the difference between the coin flip and Extended 
Coin Flip (28% vs. 50%, p<.01); the difference between the Extended 
Coin flip (50%) and the Trust Game (61%) was not significant (p<.22). 
 How can these differences in risk-rates be explained by the 
emotional states participants faced in the particular situation? 
Hence, we want to answer the question if the differences in behavior 
can be explained by the emotional perception of the decision situation 
itself (immediate emotions) as well as of the emotional perception of 
the outcomes in that specific condition (anticipated emotions). Does 
the specific situation of the Trust Game raise different emotions than 
the situation of flipping a coin? Are these emotions different from 
those experienced in the socially extended version of a coin flip? In 
addition, are these eventually occurring differences responsible for 
different risk rates within the different situations? To inquire about 
these questions we first will give an overview of the measured and 
clustered emotional states in the four anticipated and two immediate 
scenarios. 
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scenario   keep & win   keep & lose   bet/trust & win   bet/trust & lose 
cluster no.  1 2  1 2  1 2 3 4  1 2 
cluster label  easygoing confused  masterly unprepossessed  undismayed triumphantly competent delighted  anxious regretful 
               
a) mean values within the emotional clusters from 1 (low) to 5 (high)          
Valence  3.39 2.22 4.61 3.66 3.95 5.00 5.00 5.00 1.06 2.22 
Arousal  1.87 3.22 2.59 2.43 2.75 4.12 1.50 3.54 4.30 3.02 
Dominance  3.06 2.72 4.18 2.94 3.58 5.00 4.10 3.77 2.08 2.89 
               
b) share of clusters within experimental conditions           
Trust Game  24.6 75.4 57.6 42.4 30.5 13.6 37.3 18.6 49.1 50.9 
Extended Coin Flip 45.5 54.5 37.8 62.2 27.7 21.5 23.1 27.7 18.8 81.3 
Coin Flip  44.0 56.0 73.0 27.0 6.3 29.7 20.3 43.8 34.9 65.1 
               
c) bet/trust rates within experimental conditions            
Trust Game  57.1 65.1 58.8 64.0 33.3 75.0 77.3 63.6 51.7 70.0 
Extended Coin Flip 56.6 44.4 28.0 63.4 38.8 50.0 46.6 61.1 16.6 55.7 
Coin Flip  19.2 35.1 21.7 41.2 25.0 21.0 23.0 35.7 13.6 36.6 
                              
Note: due to rounding some sums might not add up to exactly 100%          
Table 7: Study 5: Emotional Cluster-Memberships for the Four Anticipated Scenarios within the Three Experimental Conditions. 
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3.4.1. Anticipated Emotional States 
Which emotional states were anticipated for the scenario of going 
with the save option, keeping the money, and learning that one would 
have won? 
 keep & win. In the situation of keep & win, participants were 
asked to imagine the outcome of keeping the money and then 
learning that they would have profited either by winning the coin flip 
or by Person B acting trustworthy. Therefore, this scenario is about 
doing the sure thing and learning that it would have been better to 
choose the risk – a good reason to be disappointed. Two emotional 
states could be identified with the cluster analysis: 62.4% of the 
participants were grouped as feeling confused (Cluster 2), while 
37.6% as feeling easygoing (Cluster 1).  
 How do these emotional clusters interact with the decision to 
take a risk? Of those grouped as confused, 49.1% decided to give the 
money away, those captured as easygoing about keeping & winning 
42.8% later risked the money – so overall no significant interrelation 
of the emotional states to the decision could be found ( =.06, p<.41). 
 How were these two groups distributed over the three 
conditions? Accordingly, did the occurrence of one of the two 
identified emotional states attached to the anticipated outcome of 
keep & win differ with regard to the framing of the decision-problem? 
With one word: yes. Experimental conditions significantly influenced 
emotional cluster membership ( =.183, p<.044). This fact is reflected 
in the majority (75.4%) of the participants feeling confused in the 
Trust Game, but only 54.5% in the Extended Coin Flip and 56% in 
the simple coin flip (Table 7b, p.85). Hence, the different framing 
raised different emotional responses. 
 Was the occurrence of specific emotions in the experimental 
variation of the framing of risk responsible for changes in behavior? 
Hence, was the distribution of emotional clusters connected to the 
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decisions in the three conditions? In the Trust Game, a majority of 
65.1% of the larger cluster of confusion sent their money to Person B 
(Table 7c, p.85). Of those who felt easygoing, 57.1% decided to give 
away their money ( =.07, p<.59). In the condition of the Extended 
Coin Flip, 44.4% of those grouped as confused and 56.6% of those 
grouped as easygoing bet their €5  ( =-.122, p<.32). In the simple 
coin flip, the difference of 15.9 percentage points between the bet 
rates of the two emotional clusters (confused 35.1%, easygoing 
19.2%) seemed to be more substantial but (similar to both other 
situations) did not reach significance ( =.173, p<.17). 
 Hence, it can be said that the specific occurrence of the 
identified emotional states in the case of anticipating the scenario of 
keep & win did not significantly influence the decision to take a risk. 
However, it should be noted that most of those participants facing a 
trust situation were grouped as ‘confused’ (75.4%), and that this was 
the cluster that over all reached the highest risk rate – although the 
small difference in risk rate compared to the ‘easygoing cluster’ 
within that situation led to the insignificant result. 
 Which emotional states were anticipated for the scenario of 
going with the save option, keeping the money, and learn that one 
would have lost? 
 keep & lose. In the scenario keep & lose participants were 
asked to imagine the outcome of keeping the money and learn that 
they would have lost either by losing the coin flip or another Person B 
revealing not to act trustworthy in the Trust Game. Therefore, this 
scenario is about doing the sure thing and learn that this was the 
right decision. Two emotional states could be identified with by the 
cluster analysis: 44.1% of the participants were grouped as feeling 
unprepossessed (Cluster 2), 55.9% as feeling masterly (Cluster 1).  
 How these emotional clusters interact with the decision to take 
a risk? Of those grouped as unprepossessed 59% decided to give the 
money, those captured as masterly about keeping & losing a minority 
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of only 35.2% later set the money on stake. So over all the bet rate of 
the cluster labeled unprepossessed was significantly higher (23.8 
percentage points) so a significant interrelation of emotions and 
decision could be found ( =.237, p<.001). 
 How these two groups were distributed over the three 
conditions? Accordingly, did the occurrence of one of the two 
identified emotional states attached to the anticipated outcome of 
keep & lose differ with regard to the framing of the decision-problem? 
For example, in which condition was the cluster labeled masterly 
dominant? In the Trust Game, 57.6% of participants belonged to this 
cluster, whereas in the Extended Coin Flip it was a minority of 37.8% 
and in the simple coin flip a majority of 73%. Hence the interrelation 
of experimental conditions with emotions was substantial ( =.294, 
p<.001) (Table 7b, p.85). 
 Was the occurrence of specific emotions in the three 
experimental conditions responsible for changes in behaviors? That 
is, was this distribution of emotional clusters connected to the 
decisions in the three conditions? The answer is ‘no’ for the Trust 
Game and the simple coin flip but as ‘strong yes’ for the Extended 
Coin Flip (Table 7c, p.85). In the Trust Game, 58.8% of those grouped 
as masterly and 64% of those grouped as unprepossessed imagining 
keeping & losing, still trusted ( =.052, p<.69). In the Extended Coin 
Flip, a minority of 28% of those grouped as masterly bet their money, 
but 63.4% of those belonging to the other cluster bet their money – a 
significant interrelation ( =.344, p<.005). In the simple coin flip, only 
21.7% of those labeled masterly decided to bet their money, of those 
labeled unprepossessed 41.2% ( =.194, p<.123). 
 So, the difference in betting rates between the clusters was 
found to be the smallest within the Trust Game and largest within 
The Extended Coin Flip. Obviously, participants facing a situation of 
trust are merely influenced by the emotions connected to a forgone 
chance (keep & lose). For all three conditions the over all result was 
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resembled: those grouped as feeling masterly when anticipating 
keeping & losing the money choose less often to take the risk than 
those labeled as unprepossessed,  which makes sense. So which 
emotional states then were anticipated for the scenario of taking the 
risk and learn that one would have won? 
 bet/trust & win. In the scenario bet/trust & win, participants 
were asked to imagine the outcome of betting the money (or trusting) 
and learning that they would have won, either by betting on the right 
side in the coin flip or another Person B acting trustworthy in the 
Trust Game. This scenario asks for the best situation for the decider: 
to risk something and being rewarded for that at the end. Four 
emotional states could be identified with the cluster analysis: 21.3% 
of the participants were grouped as feeling undismayed (Cluster 1), 
21.8% as triumphantly (Cluster 2), 26.6% as competent (Cluster 3) 
and 30.3% as delighted (Cluster 4). Of the participants, 35% in the 
‘undismayed cluster’, 41.4% in the ‘triumphantly cluster’, 54% in the 
‘competent cluster’ and 49.1% of those in the ‘delighted cluster’ 
decided to bet their money. The range of betting rates (19 percentage 
points) was not large enough to constitute significant affect of 
emotional states on the decision ( =.142, p<.29). 
 How were these four groups distributed across the three 
conditions? Did participants in the different experimental conditions 
perceive this scenario differently? Yes, they did. In the Trust Game, a 
majority was grouped either as undismayed (30.5%) or competent 
(37.3%), and a minority as either triumphantly (13.6%) or delighted 
(18.6%) (Table 7b, p.85). In the Extended Coin Flip, all clusters 
occurred fairly equally (ranging from 21.5% to 27.7%). However, the 
strongest differences were manifest in the simple coin flip: only 6.25% 
of those participants were labeled undismayed in this situation, 
20.3% were grouped as competent, 29.7% as triumphantly and 
43.75% as delighted. Obviously, the cluster distribution within the 
Trust Game and the coin flip was almost diametric. Hence, a highly 
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significant interrelation of the experimental condition with emotional 
states was found ( =.361, p<.001). 
 Was the distribution of emotional clusters connected to the 
decisions in the three conditions? Was the occurrence of specific 
emotions in the different conditions responsible for changes in 
behavior? The answer is ‘yes’ for the Trust Game but ‘no’ for both 
other conditions.  
 In the Trust Game, the majority (77.3%) of those captured as 
competent trusted an allotted Person B (Table 7c, p.85). 75% of those 
regarded as triumphantly and 63.6% of those delighted did the same. 
But only a minority of 33.3% of those grouped as undismayed did so 
– a significant interrelation of clustered emotional states and decision 
occurred ( =.389, p<.03). 
 In the Extended Coin Flip, 61.1% of those grouped as delighted, 
50% of those labeled as triumphantly, 46.6% of those captured as 
competent and 38.8% of those clustered as undismayed choose to bet 
-  so no significant connection to the decision could be found 
( =.168, p<.61). In the simple coin flip, only 25% of those grouped in 
the minimally occurring cluster of undismayed chose to set the 
money on stake, 21% of those labeled triumphantly, 23% of those 
labeled competent and 35.7% of those grouped as delighted chose to 
bet - so no significant connection to the decision could be found here 
( =.151, p<.69). 
 In the situation of trust, a majority of 37.3% of the participants 
were grouped as feeling competent when learning about taking the 
risk to trust somebody and learn that Person B acted in a 
trustworthy manner. In both non-social situations, this competent 
cluster accounted only for 20.3%-23.1% of the participants. Of this 
‘competent’ group, 77.3% trusted and also 75% of those labeled 
‘triumphantly’ did so too. Obviously, if there is an anticipated feeling 
that drives behavior in the Trust Game it is the prospect of being 
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confirmed that it is a good thing to trust somebody. One then is 
allowed to perceive herself as being a competent person. Interestingly, 
the emotional states of feeling delighted in such case occurred only 
strongly in the simple coin flip (43.75%) but just to a minor degree in 
the Trust Game (18.6%). Furthermore, the state of feeling 
undismayed has its highest portion in the Trust Game (30.5%) and 
its lowest within the trust situation (6.25%). We interpret this data as 
clear signs for the situation of trust emotionally being differently 
perceived from a simple lottery and that an increase in giving does 
not go along the same emotional path within the different scenarios. 
Which emotional states then were anticipated for the last worst-case 
scenario of taking the risk and learn that one would have lost? 
 bet/trust & lose. In the scenario of bet/trust & lose 
participants were asked to imagine the outcome of betting the money 
(or trusting) and learn that they would have lost either by betting on 
the wrong side in the coin flip or due to another Person B not acting 
in a trustworthy manner in the Trust Game. This scenario asks for 
the worst situation for the decider, to risk something and then be 
penalized for the risk. This prospect of loss might raise regret or other 
negative emotions. Two emotional states could be identified. Over all 
three experimental conditions, a majority of participants was grouped 
as regretful (66.1%) or others anxious (33.9%). Of those captured as 
anxious over all only 31.7% bet the money, of those regretful a 
majority of 52.8% gave their money away. This overall interrelation of 
emotional clusters with the decision yielded significance ( =.20, 
p<.006). 
 How were these two groups distributed over the three 
conditions? Did participants in the different experimental conditions 
perceive this scenario differently? Yes, they did. In the Trust Game, 
49.1% of the participants could be found in the cluster anxious, and 
a thin majority of 50.9% in the cluster of regretful (Table 7b, p.85). 
On the contrary, in the Extended Coin Flip, only a minority of 18.75% 
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of the participants was grouped as anxious but the rest (81.25%) were 
grouped as regretful. In the condition of the simple coin flip, 34.9% 
were labeled as anxious and 65.1% as regretful. Therefore, the cluster 
regretful was most prevalent to the Trust Game and least relevant to 
the Extended Coin Flip. Hence, the experimental condition was 
significantly connected to the cluster-memberships of emotional 
states ( =.261, p<.002). 
 Was the distribution of emotional clusters connected to the 
decisions made within the three conditions? Was the occurrence of 
specific emotions in the different conditions responsible for changes 
in behavior? The answer is ‘no’ for the Trust Game, a ‘yes’ for the 
Extended Coin Flip and a rather ‘weak yes’ for the simple coin flip 
(Table 7c, p.85). In the Trust Game, 51.7% of those in the ‘anxious 
cluster’ trusted, but 70% of those labeled regretful did so ( =.187, 
p<.15). In the Extended Coin Flip, only 16.6% of the anxious bet their 
money, but a majority of 55.7% of the ‘regretful cluster’ did the same 
– yielding a significant connection ( =.305, p<.015). In the situation 
of a simple coin flip, only 13.6% of those in the ‘anxious cluster’ took 
the risk, but 36.6% of those grouped as regretful did so – a marginally 
significant relation ( =.242, p<.055). This picture makes it clear that 
despite participants being in a clustered emotional state of anxiety 
and regretfulness, they were prone to trust in the Trust Game. In 
both other conditions, anxiety clearly hindered participants from 
taking the risk. 
 To sum up, the bivariate analysis revealed that the cluster-
membership within all four anticipated scenarios significantly differed 
by varying experimental conditions. Hence, the framing of the 
situation affected the anticipated emotions. Furthermore, it can be 
said the emotional content of the scenario of bet/trust & lose only 
influenced the decisions in the socially Extended Coin Flip, and 
marginally in the simple coin flip. The same was true for the scenario 
of keep & lose. 
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 The decision to trust was significantly influenced only by the 
emotional content perceived for the situation of trusting and learning 
that Person B acted trustworthy (trust & win). Those participants 
grouped as anticipating feeling ‘competent’ in that situation, were 
prone to trust the most. The emotional content of this scenario had 
no significant influence on the decisions in both other experimental 
conditions.
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scenario   bet/trust   keep 
cluster no.  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4 
cluster label  sceptic perplexed challenging curious  interested easygoing shy surprised 
           
a) mean values within the emotional clusters from 1 (low) to 5 (high)      
Valence  3.12 2.47 3.78 4.11 4.22 4.03 2.36 2.74 
Arousal  2.15 4.16 4.11 3.31 3.56 1.69 3.21 3.15 
Dominance  2.98 2.48 4.19 3.25 3.15 3.41 1.83 3.15 
           
b) share of clusters within experimental conditions       
Trust Game  35.6 25.4 8.5 30.5 8.5 22 25.4 44.1 
Extended Coin Flip 21.2 36.4 25.8 16.6 16.6 25.8 31.8 25.8 
Coin Flip  26.6 39 23.4 10.9 17.2 43.7 9.4 29.7 
           
c) bet/trust rates within experimental conditions        
Trust Game  52.4 66.6 60 66.6 60 69 73.3 50 
Extended Coin Flip 21.4 25 82.4 90.9 36.4 29.4 61.9 64.7 
Coin Flip  5.8 28 46.6 42.8 9.1 25 33.3 42.1 
                      
Table 8: Study 5: Emotional Cluster-Memberships for the two Immediate Scenarios within the Three Experimental Conditions. 
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3.4.2. Immediate Emotions 
Up to this point, only emotions attached to the anticipated outcomes 
were analyzed; we now switch to the emotions connected to the 
decision itself. 
 bet/trust. In the scenario of bet/trust, participants were asked 
to indicate how they would feel about betting the money (or trusting) 
immediately before they made their actual decision. Four emotional 
states could be identified: over all three experimental conditions, 
33.9% of participants were grouped as perplexed (Cluster 2), 27.5% 
as skeptic (Cluster 1), 19.6% as challenging (Cluster 3), and 19% as 
curious (Cluster 4). Of those captured as perplexed, over all 35.9% bet 
the money. Of those grouped as skeptic 28.9% gave their money 
away. On the contrary, a majority (64.9%) bet the money of those 
clustered as challenging and 69.4% of those in the ‘curious cluster’. 
This describes a strong overall interrelation of emotional clusters with 
the decision ( =.341, p<.001).  
 How were these two groups distributed over the three 
conditions? Did participants in the different experimental conditions 
perceive this scenario differently? Yes, they did. 
 In the Trust Game a part of 35.6% of the participants could be 
found in the cluster skeptic, 25.4% in the ‘perplexed cluster’, 30.5% 
in the curious and 8.5% in the ‘challenging cluster’ (Table 8b, p.94). In 
the Extended Coin Flip, the ‘skeptic cluster’ was represented by 
21.2% of the participants; 36.4% were labeled as perplexed, 16.6% as 
curious and 25.8% as challenging. In the condition of the simple coin 
flip, 26.6% were found with the label skeptic, 39% with perplexed, 
10.9% with curious and 23.4% with challenging. 
 Hence, the strongest difference of these patterns occurred for 
the membership of the ‘curious cluster’: only in the Trust Game a 
substantial part (30.5%) of the participants were found in this 
cluster. And it is also the situation of trust which where taking a risk 
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obviously is not perceived as a challenge: Only 8.5% of the 
participants in this situation were labeled as feeling ‘challenging’; in 
both other situations, this cluster occurred with a share of 23.4-
25.8%. The patterns of cluster distribution for the Extended and the 
simple coin flip were quite similar. Hence, the experimental condition 
was significantly connected to the cluster-memberships of emotional 
states ( =.293, p<.013). 
 Was the occurrence of specific immediate emotions in the 
different experimental conditions responsible for changes in 
behavior? That is, was the distribution of emotional clusters 
connected to the decisions in the three conditions? The answer is ‘no’ 
for the Trust Game, a ‘strong yes’ for the Extended Coin Flip and a 
‘weak yes’ for the simple coin flip. 
 In the Trust Game 52.4% of those in the ‘skeptic cluster’ chose 
to trust anonymous Person B, 66.6% of those labeled as perplexed 
did so, too (Table 8c, p.94). Also 2/3 of those grouped as curious and 
60% of those in the ‘challenging cluster’ decided to trust. So no 
interrelation of the emotional cluster-membership the decision could 
be found regarding the immediate emotions connected to trust 
( =.137, p<.78). 
 In the Extended Coin Flip, the opposite is the case: here a 
strong connection of the decision to bet on the coin and the emotional 
clusters could be found ( =.616, p<.001). Of those in the skeptic 
cluster, 21.4% decided to bet, as did 25% of those labeled perplexed. 
However, almost 82.4% of those within the ‘challenging cluster’ and 
90.9% of the curious decided to take the risk.  
 In the condition of a simple coin flip only 5.8% of those 
captured in the ‘skeptic cluster’ chose to bet, as did 28% of those 
labeled perplexed. 46.6% of those grouped as challenging and 42.8% 
of the curious took the risk. This constitutes only a marginally 
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significant interrelation of the decision and the clustered emotional 
states within this condition ( =.341, p<.059). 
 These distribution patterns are more similar for the Extended 
and the simple coin flip in the sense that, in the challenging and the 
curious clusters, more participants chose the risk then those in the 
skeptic and the perplexed clusters. Interestingly the differences of the 
risk rates between these two blocks (skeptic & perplexed and 
challenging & curious) are the strongest for the Extended Coin Flip, 
reaching 63.45 percentage points. 
 On the contrary, in the Trust Game a majority of those in the 
skeptic & perplexed block chose to trust (59.5%). Only slightly more 
(63.3%) of those in the challenging & curious clusters did the same. 
To the extreme contrary, only 5.8% of those labeled skeptic took the 
risk of a coin flip, but 52.4% did so in the situation of trust. Those 
grouped as ‘curious’ were most abundant in the trust situation 
(30.5%, Extended Coin Flip 16.6%, coin flip 10.9%); of these, two-
thirds decided to trust. Again this shows that the proneness to risk 
does not follow the same emotional path within the different 
situations. 
 Which emotional states, then, were perceived for the immediate 
scenario of going with the save option and keep the money? And how 
did these emotions influence the decision to take a risk within the 
different situations? 
 keep. In the scenario of keep, participants were asked to 
indicate how they would feel about keeping the money immediately 
before they made their actual decision. Four emotional states could 
be identified: over all three experimental conditions, a minority of the 
participants of 14.3% was grouped as interested (Cluster 1), 30.7% as 
easygoing (Cluster 2), 22.2% as shy (Cluster 3) and a majority of 
32.8% as surprised (Cluster 4). 
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 Of those captured as interested thinking about keeping the 
money, over all only 29.6% bet the money. Within the ‘easygoing 
cluster’ 36.2% set their money on stake. Of those grouped as shy a 
majority of 61.9% did so and of those surprised 51.6%. This describes 
a moderate overall interrelation of emotional clusters with the 
decision ( =.232, p<.017). 
 How were these two groups distributed over the three 
conditions? Did participants in the different experimental conditions 
perceive this scenario differently? Yes, they did. 
 In the Trust Game, only 8.5% of the participants within this 
condition could be found in the interested cluster (Table 8b, p.94). A 
further 22% were grouped as easygoing, 25.4% as shy and the 
majority of 44.1% as surprised to keep the money. 
 Within the Extended Coin Flip condition, 16.6% were labeled as 
interested, 25.8% as easygoing, a majority of 31.8% as shy and 
25.8% as surprised. 
 In the simple coin flip condition, 17.2% of the participants were 
captured as interested, a majority of 43.7% as easygoing, a minority 
of 9.4% as shy and 29.7% as surprised. 
 The membership of the interested cluster obviously was the 
smallest in the Trust Game, in which the majority was captured as 
surprised. The average difference belonging to the surprised within 
the Trust Game to both other conditions was 16.35 percentage 
points. The difference in belonging to the easygoing cluster was 
largest between the simple coin flip and both other conditions (19.8 
percentage points). Interestingly belonging to the socially connected 
emotion of feeling shy occurred substantially only in both situations 
with social dependencies (25.4% in the Trust Game, 31.8% in the 
Extended Coin Flip, but only 9.4% in the situation of a simple coin 
flip). The membership to easygoing when keeping the money was 
most prominent in the non-social situation of the simple coin flip 
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(43.7%, Trust Game: 22%, Extended Coin Flip 25.8%). Hence, the 
experimental condition was significantly connected to the cluster-
memberships of emotional states ( =.315, p<.005). 
 Was the distribution of emotional clusters connected to the 
decisions in the three conditions? That is, was the occurrence of 
specific immediate emotions in the different experimental conditions 
responsible for changes in behavior? The answer is ‘no’ for all three 
experimental conditions. 
 In the Trust Game, 60% of those labeled as interested chose to 
trust, while 69% of the easygoing cluster, 73.3% of the shy and the 
half of those surprised also did so ( =.212, p<.45) (Table 8c, p.94). In 
the Extended Coin Flip, only a marginal significant ( =.310, p<.10) 
interrelation could be found: 36.4% of those captured as interested 
chose to bet the money, 29.4% of the ‘easygoing cluster’, 61.9% of the 
‘shy cluster’ and 64.7% of those labeled as surprised . In the simple 
coin flip, 9.1% of the group of those captured as interested bet their 
money, while 25% of the ‘easygoing cluster’, 33.3% of the ‘shy 
cluster’ and 42.1% of those labeled interested did the same ( =.251, 
p<.26). 
 To sum up the analysis of immediate emotions for the case of 
bet/trust, the experimental condition was connected to the 
membership of emotional clusters and these were interrelated with 
the decision. These effects were the strongest for the Extended Coin 
Flip and the simple coin flip. For the trust situation, no significant 
influence could be found. 
 In the case of keep, the experimental condition also was 
significantly connected to emotional cluster membership. To the 
contrary, the interrelation of emotional clusters with the decision on 
a bivariate level only was moderate and only significant for the whole 
sample over all three experimental conditions. However, within the 
conditions, these connections did not reach significance. It must be 
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mentioned here that due to cell sizes significant connections between 
emotional clusters and the decision are harder to reach in a case of a 
four-cluster solution compared to solutions with less number of 
clusters – as they were realized for anticipated emotions. 
3.4.3. Binary-Logistic Regression Analysis  
On a descriptive bivariate level, we showed how clustered emotional 
states in the immediate and anticipated scenarios were connected to 
experimental conditions and the decision. The following five binary-
logistic regression models extend these findings. 
 Model 0 replicates the finding how the manipulation of the 
situation solely predicts differences in the risk rates within the three 
different experimental conditions. Model 1 shows how measured 
emotions regarding the four anticipated scenarios predict the decision 
(see Table 9, p.101). Model 2 shows how emotional states regarding 
the immediate scenario, or keep or risk the money, predict the 
decision. Model 3 then simultaneously uses the cluster memberships 
in the four anticipated and the two immediate situations as 
predictors for the decision. Finally, Model 4 jointly uses the variation 
of the experimental condition to answer the question how emotions 
contribute to the decision specifically and independently of the 
framing of the situation. 
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  Effects of Membership of the numbered Cluster relative to the Membership of the last Cluster for all six Measured Situations. 
  
                        
    
Model 0 
condition 
Model 1 
Anticipated 
emotions 
Model 2 
Immediate emotions 
Model 3 
All emotions 
Model 4 
All emotions & 
condition 
Variable       
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
Estimation: 
B 
Effect: 
Exp(B) 
anticipated emotions             
 keep & win Cluster 2 confused           
  Cluster 1 easygoing   - .5  .61   - .44  .64 - .42  .66 
 keep & lose Cluster 2 unprepossessed             
  Cluster 1 masterly   - .95***  .39   - .87*  .42 - .74†  .48 
 bet/trust & win Cluster 4 delighted           
  Cluster 1 undismayed   -1.12*  .33   - .88†  .42 -1.76***  .17 
  Cluster 2 triumphantly   - .24  .79   - .47  .62 - .63  .53 
  Cluster 3 competent    .04 1.04    .38 1.46 - .28  .75 
 bet/trust & lose Cluster 2 regretful           
  Cluster 1 anxious   -1.03**  .36   - .95*  .39 -1.53***  .22 
immediate emotions                         
 bet/trust Cluster 4 curious           
  Cluster 1 sceptic     -1.7 ***  .18 -1.84***  .16 -1.53**  .22 
  Cluster 2 perplexed     -1.46***  .23 -1.51***  .22 - .94†  .39 
  Cluster 3 challenging     - .39  .68 - .42  .66  .27 1.31 
 keep Cluster 4 surprised           
  Cluster 1 interested     - .85†  .43 -1.04†  .35 - .9  .41 
  Cluster 2 easygoing     - .57  .57 - .54  .58 - .01  .99 
  Cluster 3 shy      .08 1.08 - .26  .77 - .26  .77 
  situation Trust Game   1.51*** 4.54             2.34*** 10.37 
  Extended Coin Flip  .88* 2.41          .98† 2.66 
  Coin Flip            
  constant     - .97  .38 1.14 3.12 1.15 3.16 2.43 11.33 1.22 3.4 
Nagelkekes R²        .111    .165    .186    .304    .406   
Significant effect on the decision to bet/trust: †p < .10 *p < .05  **p< .01 ***p < .005              
∆R² shifting from Model 2 to Model 3 or adding Model 1 to Model 2 sig. (p < .01)         
Table 9: Study 5: Summary of Binary-logistic Regression Analysis for Clusters of Emotional States within Immediate and Anticipated 
Scenarios Predicting the Decision to Bet or Trust. 
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 Situation predicting the decision. How much of the 
differences in the risk rates within the Trust Game, the coin flip and 
the Extended Coin Flip can be explained solely by this experimental 
manipulation, leaving out our attempt to catch emotional influences? 
Model 0 in Table 9 (p.101) shows that the three conditions 
significantly predict the decider’s choice. As a sole predictor, the 
variation of the situation significantly increase the explained variance 
compared to the base model ( =15.84, p<.001) up to a Nagelkerke’s 
R² of .111. This is mainly reached through the large difference of risk 
rates between the simple coin flip and the Trust Game. Compared to 
the coin flip condition serving as the reference class, belonging to the 
Trust Game condition increases the odds to bet/trust against keeping 
the money with a factor of 
2
 =4.54 (p<.001). The odds to bet the 
money in the situation of the Extended Coin Flip, compared to the 
simple coin flip, increased by a factor of  =2.41 (p<.021). These 
findings resemble the descriptives. 
 Anticipated emotions predicting the decision. Model 1 now 
shows how the clustered emotional states connected to the 
anticipated outcomes solely predict the risky decision by intentionally 
not controlling for the impact of the experimental condition. Overall, 
this model reaches an explanatory power of Nagelkerke’s R²=.165, 
and the increase of this against the constant model is significant 
( 2 =23.98, p<.001). The emotional cluster-membership in the 
anticipated scenario of keep & win do not provide a significant impact 
on the decision. Indeed, the opposite is true for emotions attached to 
the scenario of keep & lose: belonging to the cluster labeled masterly 
significantly (p<.005) reduces the chances to bet vs. not to bet, with a 
factor of e =.39 (=1/2.56) (or reduced by 61%) relative to this ratio in 
the ‘unprepossessed cluster’. A finding showing that the interrelation 
found on a bivariate level stays stable controlled for the other three 
anticipated emotions attached to the outcomes.  
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 In the scenario of bet/trust & win, belonging to the cluster of 
undismayed and not to delighted reduces the chances to bet vs. not 
to bet with a factor of e =.33 (=1/3.03) (or 67% reduction) on a fairly 
significant level (p<.05). Contrary to the bivariate analysis now in this 
scenario, there is to constitute a specific relation between the cluster-
membership and the decision. Obviously, the simultaneous 
consideration of the emotional states regarding the other three 
anticipated emotional states filters out a unique contribution of this 
scenario. 
 In the anticipated scenario of bet/trust & lose overall 
experimental conditions, the attribute of being a member of the 
cluster anxious and not regretful reduces the chance to set the 
money on stake vs. not, by a factor of e =.36 (=1/2.77) (or 64% 
reduction, p<.01). 
 Immediate emotions predicting the decision. Model 2 shows 
how immediate emotions gain influence on the decision without 
controlling for the experimental condition. Compared to the 
anticipated emotional states (Model 1), this model gains a slightly 
higher explanative power (Nagelkerke’s R²=.186, 2 =27.29, p<.001), 
and this difference in model fit (measured by Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC)) provides moderate positive support for better fit of this 
model (BIC= 2 =3.31) compared to Model 1. 
 It is within the immediate scenario of bet/trust, where specific 
cluster-memberships strongly affect the decision to take a risk. Being 
a member of the ‘skeptic cluster’ and not of the curious, strongly 
reduces (by 82%) the chances of betting the money vs. not to bet (by 
a factor of e =.18 (=1/5.55). Similar is true for belonging to the 
cluster perplexed: the ratio of bet vs. not bet is reduced by 78% (by a 
factor of e =.23 (=1/4.35). Again, the findings of the bivariate 
analysis are confirmed here. 
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 The anticipated scenario of keeping the money only gains 
marginal influence on the decision: Being a member of the interested 
cluster and not of the surprised reduces the chance to bet vs. not to 
bet by 57% (with a factor of e =.43=1/2.33), which is marginally 
significant (p<.10). 
 Anticipated and immediate emotions predicting the 
decision. The question arises if the influences of both types of 
emotions stay stable when added jointly as independent variables to 
predict the decision. This is what Model 3 does: By combining both 
types of emotions in Model 3 now simultaneously it is controlled for 
potential patterns of dependencies, e.g. belonging to one cluster in 
one of the immediate measures always combines with being a 
member of a specific cluster in one of the anticipated scenarios. 
 Explanative power of this model increases significantly 
(Nagelkerke’s R²=.304) independent of the direction (adding Model 2 
to Model 1 ( 2 =23.0, p<.001) or the other way around ( 2 =19.68, 
p<.003)). This shows that both types of emotions uniquely 
significantly affect the decision, so that immediate emotions cannot 
bee seen as the as the mirror of the other and vice versa. 
 Overall, the patterns of influence stay quite stable but it is to 
mention that anticipated emotional states in general lose significance. 
The contrary is true for the influences of the immediate emotions: the 
strong effects of the emotions connected to the immediate situation of 
bet/trust even increase their influence – the coefficients for the 
clusters of skeptic & perplexed grow and hold their high level of 
significance (p<.005). In the immediate scenario, to keep the money 
belonging to the ‘interested cluster’ and not in the surprised now 
gains marginal significance on a 10% level. A possible explanation for 
these changes is given later. 
 Anticipated and immediate emotions’ unique contribution. 
Until now, only emotional cluster-memberships were used without 
controlling for the experimental condition. Model 4 takes the 
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influence of this variation of the situation into account. Here, we 
investigate what influence emotional states exhibit beyond the power 
of the situation shown in Model 0. 
 By adding the experimental manipulation of the framing of the 
situation as predictor explained variance significantly increases to 
Nagelkerke’s R²=.406 ( 2 =18.97, p<.001). 
 The influences of the experimental variation (Model 0) stay 
quite stable in this comprehensive Model 4, showing that 
participating in the situation of a Trust Game heavily changes the 
chances to set money on stakes: the odds of taking the risk increases 
by a factor of e =10.37 compared to the odds in the simple coin flip. 
Taking part in the Extended Coin Flip moderately increases these 
odds by 166% ( e =2.66) at a 10% level of significance. 
 Adding the experimental condition in Model 4 also controls for 
the interaction of the experimental condition and the emotional 
states, as well as the influence of the experimental condition on the 
decision, of course. Hence, those other independent variables with 
both, a strong connection to the experimental condition as well as 
strong influence on the decision are influenced the most by this step. 
This Model 4 also controls for the interaction of the experimental 
condition with the strength of the interrelations between the 
independent variables on a latent level. 
 Over all, controlling for the experimental condition weakens the 
influence that immediate emotions have on the decision, and 
strengthens the influence of anticipated emotions by increasing their 
specificity, as it can be observed when shifting from Model 3 to Model 
4. The reason for that is the combination of control for the interaction 
of the experimental condition with the strength of the interrelation 
between the independent variables as described in the following. 
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3.4.4. Interaction Analysis 
Can it be said that immediate emotions simply reflect anticipated 
emotions and thus, in this sense at least, a consequentialistic mode 
of accessing the decision is decisive for behavior? 
 Interrelation of immediate and anticipated emotions. In all 
three conditions, we find an interrelation of the emotional states 
within the immediate scenario to bet/trust and the anticipated to 
bet/trust & win. This connection varies in the narrow corridor of 
 =.552 (Cramer’s V=.318, p<.019) within the situation of an 
Extended Coin Flip and  =.595 (Cramer’s V=.344, p<.007) in the 
simple coin flip with the Trust Game in between =.562 (Cramer’s 
V=.324, p<.028). This means that participants clustered in a specific 
emotional state while thinking about betting the money, now tend 
also to be clustered in a specific emotional state regarding the 
situation of trusting/betting and winning. 
 But this finding does not allow for the assertion that the 
emotional state in the immediate situation to bet is just a reflection of 
that state anticipated. If this were true, in a regression analysis, only 
the decisive, anticipated emotions would gain influence on the 
decision. But this is not the case due to the fact that this 
interrelation is far from perfect; hence, the immediate emotions 
contribute specifically beyond the anticipated. 
 An interrelation of the cluster-memberships in the immediate 
scenario of betting and the anticipated scenario of keep & win could 
be found only for the simple ( =.369, p<.035) and the Extended Coin 
Flip ( =.353, p<.041). This can be read as a suggestion that in a 
trust situation, anticipation about the disappointment of a foregone 
chance is not necessarily directly reflected in the emotional 
experience when thinking about trusting another person. This 
argument is strengthened because furthermore it is only the case for 
both lottery situations (simple and Extended Coin Flip) that the 
anticipated emotional states regarding the situation of bet & win is 
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related to those in the immediate scenario to keep the money 
( =.399, p<.018;  =.424, p<.006). 
 Finally, only in the situation of a simple coin flip could a strong 
relationship be found between the immediate scenario of to bet the 
money and the anticipation regarding the regrettable outcome of bet 
& lose ( =.644, p<.006). No significant connection was found in 
either situation with social dependencies. 
 It was to expect that some relationship would appear between 
immediate emotions regarding the decision itself and the anticipated 
emotional states attached to the possible outcomes. However, these 
connections show a clear pattern of impairment by the experimental 
condition. It is this pattern that is controlled for by adding the 
experimental variation to the regression analyses. Accordingly, the 
effects of emotions shown in Model 4 are specific in the sense that 
their contribution to the decision beyond the experimental condition 
can be observed. 
 How might the interrelations among anticipated emotions 
dependent on the experimental condition sign responsible for 
changes when controlling for the situational variation in Model 4? 
  Interrelations among anticipated emotional states. The 
interrelation of the cluster-memberships among all anticipated 
scenarios is weak (from  =-.212, p<.004 to  =.246, p<.001) over all 
experimental conditions. The influence of the experimental condition 
on the strength of interrelation among the anticipated emotional 
states also is weaker than for the immediate emotional states 
described before. The maximal difference of an interrelation is 
reached with  =.367 within the scenarios of keep/lose and 
bet/trust & lose. This interrelation is found only in the situation of 
Extended Coin Flip: for both other situations it is not significant. No 
interrelation could be found in any experimental condition for keep & 
win with keep & lose or for keep & win with bet/trust & win. The 
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emotional states within keep & win and bet/trust & lose were found 
to be significantly connected only in the Extended Coin Flip ( =-.276, 
p<.027). The interrelation of the emotional clusters within keep & lose 
and bet/trust & win did not reach significance in any of the three 
conditions. Similarly,  a strong interaction was manifest only in the 
Extended Coin Flip ( =.455, p<.001) for keep & lose and bet/trust & 
lose. This was also the case for the interaction of the emotional states 
within bet/trust & win and its counterpart bet/trust & lose: only in 
the Extended Coin Flip did the interaction reach marginal 
significance ( =.347, p<.055). 
 One result of this short interaction analyses is obvious: in the 
Extended Coin Flip, participants were most clear what to indicate, as 
that is where the most excluding patterns of cluster-memberships 
could be found. 
 Finally, we address the interrelation of measured emotional 
states regarding both immediate scenarios. How are they connected, 
and can it be said that immediate emotions in the case of taking the 
sure options are just a mirror of those emotions displayed in the 
option of taking the risk? 
 Interrelations among immediate emotions. The strength of 
interrelation varies the most for both immediate scenarios: 
interestingly the interrelation of the emotional cluster-memberships 
within the immediate situation to bet/trust with those given for keep 
is strong in both the simple ( =.574, p<.012) and the Extended Coin 
Flip ( =.643, p<.001) but absolutely weak in the Trust Game 
( =.248, n.s.). The maximum difference of strength of interrelation is 
given between the Extended Coin Flip and the Trust Game, with 
 =.395. This serves as another hint that the trust situation is 
distinguished from other risky decisions and that it was easier for the 
participants to apply an on/off structure of the decision in the 
Extended Coin Flip and the simple coin flip. Here, feeling one thing 
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regarding the decision to give money often leads to feel the opposite 
thing when keeping it. The contrary is true for the situation of trust: 
here emotions to trust or not to trust do not follow a simple structure 
as feeling bad with one option and good with the other. 
 Unfortunately, due to our small sample size, we could not 
control for the investigated interaction effects within the binary-
logistic regression. The models would be heavily over-specified even 
by controlling just for the interaction of the experimental situation 
with the 3*6 measured emotional states (adding 18 more predictors). 
This also holds true for controlling for the interaction of immediate 
with anticipated emotional states. 
3.4.5. Mediation 
Nevertheless, the regression findings open the gate for investigating 
the question of which emotional scenario mediates the influence of 
the experimental manipulation. 
 Mediation Model I. The question arises of whether or not the 
effect of emotions is traceable as mediation in such a way that a 
different condition influences the immediate or anticipated emotions 
which then affect the decision (Figure 6, p.110). In short: our data 
show that this path does exist for taking the route of anticipated 
emotions. 
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situation: 
Trust Game or 
coin flip or 
Extended Coin Flip 
decision: 
immediate emotions 
betting/trusting 
immediate emotions 
keeping the money 
anticipated emotions 
keeping and losing 
anticipated emotions 
keeping and winning 
anticipated emotions 
betting/trusting & 
anticipated emotions 
betting/trusting & 
bet/trust or 
keep the money 
 
Figure 6: Study 5: Mediation I: How emotions mediate the effect of a changed 
situation (Trust Game, Extended Coin Flip, Coin Flip) to changes in behavior 
 A multinomial regression with the experimental condition as a 
predictor and the memberships to the clustered emotional states as 
the dependent variable shows a significant influence of the 
anticipated emotional state in the situation of take the risk and win 
(Nagelkerke’s R² =.14, p<.001;  =.36, p<.001). This relation is the 
strongest compared to all five other measured emotional scenarios. 
That these anticipated emotional states, connected to the situation of 
trust/bet & win, significantly influence the decision was already 
shown before with the regression in Model 4, Table 9 (p.101). To 
constitute mediation now, it has to be shown that the direct effect 
from changing objective probabilities on the decisions is significantly 
reduced when the mediators, in form of relevant emotional states, are 
added simultaneously. By controlling for the non-normality 
distribution of the indirect effect a bootstrap test with 5000 re-
samples (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Kenny, 2008; Preacher and Hayes, 
2008a, 2004) reveals that this is indeed the case for the mentioned 
cluster-membership in the mentioned anticipated scenario (with a 5% 
probability to err). The effect size, measured as index of mediation 
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(Preacher and Hayes, 2008b), yielded an effect of .169 (lower level 
95% confidence interval = .032; upper level 95 % confidence interval 
= .333). Following MacKinnon and Dwyer (1993) and Sobel (1982), 
the specific indirect effect size measured as the proportion of the total 
effect that is mediated yielded 22.4%. Note that in the applied model 
such a specific indirect effect could be found only along the described 
anticipated emotions, but not with any of the immediate emotions8. 
This mediation was transported by the emotional states in that 
scenario which had the strongest specific connection to the 
experimental condition, as well as to the decision over all conditions.  
 Mediation Model II. A different picture is drawn when 
reducing the independent variation of the experimental condition to a 
binary world of either playing the simple coin flip or the Trust Game 
(Figure 7, p.112). Our findings indicate that the situation of an 
Extended Coin Flip was more similar to a Trust Game regarding the 
behavioral outcome. It was also the situation with the most 
interdependencies for immediate with anticipated emotional states, 
which was also true for the interdependencies within the two 
immediate and four anticipated scenarios. This is why another 
mediation analysis that didn’t consider this special experimental 
condition was conducted. 
 An open clustering process grouping the emotional states 
excluding the Extended Coin Flip leads to a regression Model 
analogous to Model 4 in Table 9 (p.101), using emotional states and 
the experimental condition as predictors. This approach was not used 
from the beginning because we had the idea to run the clustering 
process over all three conditions hoping to filter out distinctive 
emotional patters which then predict behavior – which worked out 
successfully. But obviously the situation of an Extended Coin Flip 
was unique since, for the participants, it seemed to be very clear how 
                                                 
8 These tests were conducted with the latest available scripts by Preacher & Hayes 
(2004, 2008) and were confirmed with Mplus software Version 5.2 (Muthén, L.K. 
and Muthén, B.O. (1998-2007) 
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they should feel depending on the scenarios. However, running the 
regression analysis just for the situation of the simple coin flip and 
the Trust Game would have resulted in insignificant coefficients of 
emotional influences in Models similar to Model 1-3 due to the small 
sample size of n=123. 
 In a complete Model, including immediate and anticipated 
emotional states as well as the experimental manipulation (simple 
coin flip and Trust Game), the anticipated scenarios, in the case of 
bet/trust & win and bet/trust & lose, and the immediate emotions, 
regarding to bet/trust, were found to significantly influence the 
decision. Hence, a mediation model was calculated, showing that the 
above-mentioned emotional states partially mediated the influence 
that the different situations had on the decision. 
situation: 
Trust Game 
or 
coin flip 
decision: 
immediate emotions 
betting/trusting 
immediate emotions 
keeping the money 
anticipated emotions 
keeping and losing 
anticipated emotions 
keeping and winning 
anticipated emotions 
betting/trusting & 
anticipated emotions 
betting/trusting & 
bet/trust or 
keep the money 
 
Figure 7: Study 5: Mediation II: How emotions mediate the effect of a changed 
situation (Trust Game, Coin Flip) to changes in behavior 
 Using the described method, the specific indirect effects gain 
mediation as follows: For the emotional states within the anticipated 
scenario of bet/trust & win, the effect size measured as index of 
mediation (Preacher and Hayes, 2008b) yielded an effect of .417 
(lower level 94% confidence interval = .092; upper level 94 % 
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confidence interval = .681). Hence the specific indirect effect size, 
measured as the proportion of the total effect that is mediated, 
yielded 57.7 %. The emotional states anticipated for scenario of 
bet/trust & lose indirectly transported the effects of the experimental 
variation on the decision with an index of mediation of .326 (lower 
level 94% confidence interval = .048; upper level 94 % confidence 
interval = .610). Accordingly, the specific indirect effect size, 
measured as the proportion of the total effect that is mediated, is 
45.1%. 
 Additionally, the immediate emotions regarding to bet/trust 
yielded an index of mediation of .179 (lower level 94% confidence 
interval = .009; upper level 94 % confidence interval = .43)9. So, the 
specific indirect effect size, measured as the proportion of the total 
effect that is mediated, gains 27.7%. This clearly shows that when the 
somehow exotic Extended Coin Flip is left out of the mediation 
analysis, differences in the immediate emotional states regarding to 
bet/trust specifically contribute to the decision within the situation of 
a simple lottery (coin flip) and a situation of trust. 
3.5. General Discussion 
This analysis aimed to show that the perceived emotional content in a 
situation of trust differs from that perceived in a simple lottery and a 
lottery extended by possible benefits for another person and that this 
difference accounts for the different risk rates within the different 
conditions. 
 The variation of the situation did influence participants’ 
willingness to take a risk. The risk rates within clustered emotional 
states for immediate and anticipated scenarios varied. Additionally, it 
is possible to demonstrate from this data that different emotional 
                                                 
9 The sum of the indirect effects measured as proportions of proportion of the total 
effect mediated gains more than 100% because of interrelations of the mediators 
among each other. 
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states are dominant within different anticipated and immediate 
scenarios depending on the framing of the decision problem, and the 
variation of the occurrence of these states are connected to the 
decision made. 
 A regression analysis showed that immediate emotions 
connected to taking the risk affected the decision. Taking anticipated 
emotions into account revealed that their influence was weaker than 
immediate emotions. A regression controlling for the effect of the 
farming of the decision showed a different picture: The strongest 
mediator surviving the variation of all three experimental settings was 
the anticipated emotional state in the case of bet/trust & win. 
However, it should be noted that this mediation is caused by the 
significant additional emotional effect of our emotional measures, 
above and beyond that strong direct effect carried by the variation of 
the situation itself. An important role was also played by the effect of 
bet/trust & lose. The effect of bet/trust & win was driven by its 
prominent role in the situation of trust. Contrarily, the effect of 
bet/trust & lose was important within the Extended Coin Flip but less 
important in the simple coin flip. 
 Additionally, the immediate emotions connected to take the risk 
had a significant effect on the decision as well. These effects were 
driven by their prominent role on the decision within the situation of 
the Extended and the simple coin flip. 
 Unfortunately, due to limited sample size, not all possible 
interaction effects were controlled for within the binary regression 
analysis. However,  an analysis of these interaction effects on a 
bivariate level revealed that interdependencies of immediate with 
anticipated emotional states vary heavily for the three different 
situations: the most occur for the simple coin flip, less for the 
extended and not at all for the Trust Game. This shows that 
especially the immediate emotions connected to a situation of trust 
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cannot be seen as reflections of emotional anticipations regarding the 
outcomes. 
 Furthermore, interdependencies of the emotional cluster-
memberships among the four anticipated scenarios were the weakest 
for the Trust Game but the strongest for the Extended Coin Flip. The 
interdependencies among both immediate scenarios to keep the 
money or bet/trust was prominent for the simple coin flip and the 
Extended Coin Flip but not for the Trust Game. This again shows 
that immediate emotions, especially in situation of trust, cannot be 
said to follow a simple on/off structure. 
 Reducing the complexity of the design by analyzing a mediation 
model, which contrasts only the situation of a simple coin flip with 
the Trust Game, reveals that effects of the situation on the decision 
are carried by specific indirect effects of the anticipated scenario of 
bet/trust & win, bet/trust & lose and the immediate emotional state 
connected to take the risk. Thus, immediate emotions differ between 
a simple lottery and a situation of trust and this difference affects the 
decision. 
3.5.1. Trust Driven by Anticipations? 
Contrary to former findings (Schlösser, 2006) this study could not 
show that immediate emotions play a crucial role for the decision to 
trust an anonymous person. Immediate emotions did play a role for 
the simple lottery and a lottery with social dependencies. It seems 
that in the setting given in the study on hands, participants’ decision 
to trust was driven by the warm glow of the anticipated feeling to 
have done the right thing – that they trust, and this risky choice is 
rewarded. The feeling connected to the largest share taking the risk 
was ‘competent’. 
 Unfortunately the effects of emotions could not be shown for 
every one of the three different experimental conditions. This was due 
to the small sample size combined with the number of predictors 
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leading to the boarders of the stability of a regression analysis. This is 
the reason why our regression analysis focused only on emotional 
effects beyond the situation. 
 The exclusive patterns of emotional interactions occurring 
within the other socially risky decision (Extended Coin Flip) showed 
that participants had a very clear idea how they would feel and how 
they felt with their decision. The contrary was true for the Trust 
Game. 
 A reason for this structure of findings might be that the 
experimenters introduced the experiment as a challenge of financial 
decision-making aloud10. This might have had an impact on the 
perception of the Trust Game, changing it into an investment 
situation. Perhaps this was why anticipated emotional states 
mattered most here. 
 The Extended Coin Flip framing might not be as sensitive to 
such an influence because here Person B never had an active role. 
Person B never decided to act trustworthy but is just the lucky one 
when the gambler loses. 
 Even when the outcomes of both situations are structurally the 
same, it could be that participants frame the role of Person B being 
an active one only in the Trust Game, even if the chances of win and 
loss are similar for both framings. In that sense, an Extended Coin 
Flip is the simpler social situation. Hence, this situation might not as 
easily influenced by the assertion that it is about financial decision 
making because in any case it is more like a lottery where another 
person profits from the gambler’s bad luck.  
3.5.2. Are Immediate Emotions Tautological? 
One might argue that the demonstrated effects of immediate 
emotions are just an artifact of tautology: Once people decide to bet 
they will surely indicate compatible emotional states when asked 
                                                 
10 I would like to thank Jan Bruch and Alexander Schneider for collecting the data. 
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about those states after they have made their decision. But, the 
participants were asked to indicate their emotions for both possible 
alternatives of betting or keeping the money, immediately before they 
had to make their final decision. 
 The independence of emotional cluster memberships for both 
immediate scenarios was confirmed the most for the Trust Game. 
However, there was evidence for a pattern of cross-over group 
interrelationship for the clusters in both other experimental 
scenarios. Especially the findings of independence in the Trust Game 
reflect the existing diversity of immediate emotions especially in that 
situation, indicating that positive emotions in the situation of keeping 
the money do not automatically determine the existence of bad 
emotions when trusting – and vice versa. But also for the Extended 
Coin Flip and the simple coin flip, the interrelation was similarly far 
from perfect. 
 Consequently, an approach to capture different distinct 
emotional states seems to be advisable, because people experience 
such distinctive states, which affect the decision to bet/trust in a 
sophisticated manner. It is not a dichotomous on/off structure of 
mutually exclusive binary good or bad emotions which determine the 
decision to choose the risky option. Such complex states are found 
not only for immediate emotions but also for anticipated emotions. 
 Furthermore, we could show that relevant immediate emotions 
are not just reflections of the anticipated emotions. Hence, immediate 
emotions contribute uniquely to the prediction of actual behavior. 
3.5.3. Immediacy 
Between the two sessions conducted there was a gap of one week. 
One might argue that this gap is too long, so that effects of hyperbolic 
discounting (Green, Fry, and Myerson, 1994; McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, Cohen, 2004) in the first session may arise. For the 
case of the Trust Game this objection actually strengthens our 
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argument further, confirming that the situation of trust differs from 
other risky decisions: the time-lag announced places a stress on trust 
as an inter-temporal uncertainty, and therefore the effect of time-
discounting should lower trust rates. Even given this long waiting 
time before the revealing of the consequences, participants in the 
Trust Game showed high rates of trust compared to those in the 
simple coin flip. 
 Differences in trust rates between the three experimental 
conditions can not be explained by such time-discounting effects 
because in all situations the time-lag was held constant with one 
week tie until the outcomes were revealed. 
3.5.4. The Conception of Trust in the Trust Game 
The discrete structure of the trust game played in this study is a 
variant of a game called The Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995), 
which uses divisible continuous amounts to measure the extent of 
trust and trustworthiness in the form of amounts sent (one trustor 
sending €4 of €5 shows more trust than another trustor sending €2 
of €5, and analogue for the trustee’s trustworthiness). 
 The discrete variant of the game establishes a situation in the 
experiment which is closer to real-life trust decisions. Pilutla, 
Malhotra, and Murninghan (2003) showed that trustors only had the 
chance to obtain a final outcome close to, or slightly exceeding, their 
endowment if they decided to send the entire (or nearly entire) 
amount: only a full contribution is seen as a signal of trust, which 
produces an obligation for the trustee to show full trustworthiness in 
the form of giving back the amount sent by Person A (reciprocating) 
or – more often – equalizing outcomes (a reward). So a game played 
with discrete amounts is more real from both players’ perspectives: 
The trustor does not have an opportunity to reduce his risk by 
reducing his trust in the trustee. Only two options are relevant: to 
trust or to distrust. There is, after all, no half lunch (or trust) for 
either of them. Discrete games have already been examined by, 
119 
amongst others, Eckel and Wilson (2001), Snijders and Keren (2001) 
and Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2005). 
 Still, the question remains as to whether this design, based on 
a monetary decision, is able to represent a real-life trust decision. The 
divisible character of money and learned rules of handling it might 
trigger higher cognitive involvement, so that System 2 reasoning 
processes are involved that might be less involved in real trust 
situations. Due to the indivisible character of trust, our findings 
might be confirmed even more strongly when playing a trust game 
with goods rather than money. At this point, the trust game would 
leave its origin of the Investment Game and step into the arena of 
indivisible goods, as real trust also does. This might happen 
experimentally with a design where knowledge is the object of trust, 
making participants depending on each other’s specific knowledge in 
a quiz or in an examination. The supposition going along with the 
previous argument is that participants in such situations show even 
higher rates of trust. 
3.5.5. Neuro-Economics 
Different findings in Neuro-Economics (McClure, Laibson, 
Loewenstein, Cohen, 2004; Sanfey, Rilling, Aroson, Nystrom, Cohen, 
2003) and advanced comments on these (Camerer, 2003; Greene et 
al., 2004; Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure, Cohen, 2006; Fehr et al., 
2005) lead in a direction that might be able to explain these 
somewhat ambiguous findings. On the one hand the present study 
found that only anticipated emotions mediate the effect of the 
changed framing of the situation on the actual decision when all 
three experimental conditions were considered. Furthermore, it was 
possible to demonstrate that immediate emotions in the situation of 
giving the money affected the decision. An explanation for this might 
be given by the perspective of an underlying dual-process model, as 
was theoretically proposed by Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2005). 
The two different classes of processes find their expression in the 
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grade of stimulant of different brain areas during decision processes: 
deliberative System-2 processes and affective System-1 processes are 
mediated by a third area, detecting the conflict between goal-based 
reasoning and emotions or basic motivations. 
 Without drawing causal conclusion from these physiological 
findings one could think about the case where people behave against 
their feelings because they set a rational reason higher and suppress 
their intuition trough willpower. It could also be the case that people 
do follow their emotions but then post-rationalize their emotion-
based decision. 
 Decision-making tasks are solved by combinations of processes 
resulting in a wide spectrum between the totally reason-based and 
rational on the one end and the totally affective at the other end. It 
might be argued that decisions of trust are more similar to easy 
personal moral dilemmas and therefore are typically solved by 
processes with higher emotional and less cognitive involvement 
(Green et al., 2004). In the situation of the trust game and other 
every-day situations of trust they easily might follow the social-
intuitionists model (Haidt, 2001). But following a moral intuition 
might emotionally reflect two-fold: on the one hand in the fact that 
immediate emotions play the leading part (Schlösser, 2006), on the 
other hand by the warm glow of having done the right thing in case of 
a successfully act of rewarded trust which has to be distinguished 
from the happiness of a lucky gambler. 
 In situations of real risky decisions outside the laboratory, 
where stronger social dependencies may emerge, higher involvement 
of both types of processes is to be expected. This does not mean that 
rate of risk inevitably decrease. On the contrary, most of such high-
cost decisions at least might be made from sentiment. The fact that 
the strength of intuitive emotions was found even in the artificial 
experimental situation should lead us to the conclusion that such 
processes might build the bridge for crossing the Rubicon in real 
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decisions when reasoning processes must find their borders. Thus, 
even in decision-making involving higher rational reasoning 
processes, the power of intuition might still be needed to finally make 
the decision. The structure of brain activity when chosing risky 
options with social dependencies remains an object for further neuro-
economic research, as well as the relationship of trusting behavior to 
moral judgment. 
3.5.6. Cultural differences 
Compared to the results of Fetchenhauer and Dunning (in press) we 
find participants taking the bet in the Extended Coin Flip much more 
often (50% in Germany vs. 28% in the US). Behavior in the Trust 
Game is largely the same in the two countries (61% in Germany vs. 
59.3% in the US), so the question arises, if such differences are 
explained by differences in the perception of the Extended Coin Flip 
situation. The descriptions of the situation were very the same. What 
does make a difference is the feature of the situation Person A 
focuses on: is it the bet or is it the dependency of Person B? One 
explanation might be the ease with which the dependency of Person B 
is suppressed or ignored. It is easy to escape from a moral dilemma 
here by arguing with chances: Person B is allotted to Person A so it’s 
just luck for Person B to pick a pro-social Person A. This argument 
can be used to weaken the dependency of Person B. Or it could be 
the case that one group really thinks more in the line with the 
enlarge-the-pie logic among students. It might be the case that 
cultural influences underlie how this focus is placed. This question 
will be investigated in our future research. 
3.5.7. Conclusion 
A clear, direct effect of immediate and anticipated emotions on the 
actual decisions was found. This effect remains substantial, even 
when controlling for social dependencies of risky decisions: Beyond 
the effects captured by the framing of the situation, both types of 
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emotions play a crucial role for deciding to take risk a risk or not. The 
analysis of the emotional content perceived in the different 
experimental conditions reveals that for most people trust is not just 
another bet. Contrary to former findings the decision to trust was 
mainly driven by the emotional anticipations attached to the outcome 
that one trusted and that this act is rewarded by a trustworthy 
counterpart. 
 Nearly four hundred years ago, Pascal addressed dual-process 
modes of thinking in a passage that reads like an appeal to inquire 
about how reasoning is informed by emotions - and the other way 
around. He aimed for an approach beyond the separation of these two 
perspectives – a thing he called heart. 
All our reasoning reduces itself to yielding to 
feeling. 
But fancy is like, though contrary to, feeling, 
so that we cannot distinguish between these 
contraries. One person says that my feeling is 
fancy, another that his fancy is feeling. We 
should have a rule. Reason offers itself; but it 
is pliable in every sense; and thus there is no 
rule.  
(Blaise Pascal, 1660) 
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4. General Discussion and Preview 
Overall our data show that even in very simple situations of deciding 
to take a manageable risk or not emotions attached to the outcomes 
do play a role. A fact which is not surprising to those who assume the 
decision-making process regarding risky options to follow a con-
sequentialistic path. 
 But questioning this common approach the main finding 
emerged is that immediate emotions attached to the decision itself 
mostly do play the decisive role. Their impact on the decision could 
be found to act independent of anticipated emotions and changes in 
objective or subjective probabilities. Beside this independent 
influence they partly mediated the effects of changed objective 
chances on the decision. This finding contradicts the 
consequentialistic approach. 
 Especially the immediate emotions regarding to keeping the 
money were found to be very different comparing these captured 
within a framing of a decision to trust or the framing of a coin flip. 
Not controlling for the effect of the change in situation but for 
simultaneous influences of the anticipated emotions immediate 
emotions clearly ruled out the effects of anticipations (Model 3, Table 
9, Chapter 3.4.3, p.101). A mediation analysis contrasting both 
situations revealed that the effects of framing the situation as a coin 
flip or trust on the decision partly was transported via immediate and 
anticipated emotions. 
 Due to small sample sizes the social and non-social situations 
in Chapter 3 could not be analyzed properly distinct from each other. 
As described before, other features of the study design may have led 
the results to differ from former results. Schlösser (2006) showed that 
in the situation of trust contrary to the data presented, here clearly 
immediate emotions affected the actual decision whereas the 
anticipated did not. 
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 To investigate the question how these results can be so 
inconsistent with one another a future study will contrast the 
situation of a coin flip, an Extended Coin Flip, a Trust and a Dictator 
Game with sufficient sample sizes in each condition (n=200). 
4.1. Trust and Moral Emotions 
Due to the fact that Schlösser (2006) could also show that 
anticipations regarding emotions attached to the outcomes were 
strikingly exact – similar to the findings in Study 4 on hand - a mixed 
picture of emotional influences might show up in future studies. On 
the one hand immediate emotions might play a leading role, if 
anticipated emotions come into play it might be in the form of the 
anticipated warm glow of having done the right thing. Doing the right 
thing here is filled with the emotional content of feeling as a 
‘competent’ person whose venture to expose herself vulnerable to the 
other person comes to a good end. This pay-off might be quite 
independent of the actual height of reward because the value of a 
warm glow is independent of a monetary payoff. This fits to results 
which show the large extend of independence of people’s willingness 
to give away their money and the height of stakes in a very real trust 
setting (Johansson-Stenman, Mahmud, Martinsson, 2005).  
 This hypothesis would also fit to another finding of 
Fetchenhauer and Dunning (2009) who showed that the elasticity 
with which participants reacted to different chances was 
substantially lower when the situation was framed as a decision to 
risk compared to a simple lottery. The share of those who were willing 
to trust another anonymous person increased from 56% when the 
chance to meet a trustworthy person was set to 46% to a share of 
70% when this chance was set to 80% (a step of 14 percentage 
points). The same step in winning chances caused a substantially 
stronger increase of the willingness to bet in a simple lottery. The 
share of persons betting their money with a 46% chance of winning 
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was 28%, but when the chances were set to 80%, 78% of the 
participants took the risk (a step of 50 percentage points). Hence, a 
change in the chances that taking a risk pays off, took substantially 
less effect on the decision to trust compared to the decision to bet. 
 The type of a trust situation might in that sense be akin to 
moral judgement in a sense that people feel the duty to trust another 
person because it is the right thing to do. In that respect it also might 
be more similar to the act of voting, which is bound to the value of 
being a good citizen which is a need of a good democracy. In this 
decision problem people share very pessimistic beliefs about the 
gains of that action but overwhelmingly tend to vote, similar to the 
pessimistic believes of others trustworthiness in trust situations. If 
the proneness to trust also is driven by something one might call 
values or norms, the question arises how these values can survive 
when only a minor share consciously believes in them but a larger 
share act against their beliefs and trust against all odds. Thus, 
somehow the knowledge about the efficiency of a successful act of 
trust and trustworthiness is shared unconsciously. But what is the 
source of the warm glow of such an exchange and the bad feelings 
connected to the decision not to trust another person? We found that 
emotions do play a role but we do not know how they arise. 
 The same is true for other moral actions like punishing 
unsocial behavior of a person adverse to another person without 
gaining personal advantage from that action. Such altruistic (or third-
party) punishment happens even when the victim of the injustice act 
has drawbacks from that action. Individuals’ proneness to punish in 
that sense has been shown to be connected to the personality trait of 
Justice Sensitivity from a beneficiaries’ perspective: those who are 
more sensible to perceive injustice when passively profiting from an 
act of injustice against another person were more willing to punish 
(Lotz, Gresser, Schlösser, Baumert, Fetchenhauer, 2009). Hence 
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moral emotions which were more likely to occur for specific 
personality traits were partly responsible for the decision to punish.  
4.2. Individual Differences 
It is to question to what extend individual differences in the interplay 
of immediate emotions and anticipated emotions change the 
individual decision. It could be the case that stable personality traits 
influence the interaction of both types of emotions in a sense that the 
predictive power of either immediate or anticipated emotions varies 
systematically with personality. This then would separate those who 
decide more on an intuitive path from those elaborating more about 
possible outcomes more and put effort into finding reasons for their 
decision. First results show in a surprising way that this might be a 
reasonable hypothesis: 
4.2.1. Personal Need for Structure 
In Study 4 (Ellsberg-Paradox) the personality trait Personal Need for 
Structure was collected from the participants and its connections 
with the interplay of both types of emotions was analyzed. This 
analysis reveals that for the decision of participants who score low on 
the scale of Personal Need for Structure only anticipated emotional 
states were relevant (with a predictive power of Nagelkerke’s R²=.48). 
Only the anticipated emotional states in the case of winning with the 
ambiguous urn or losing with the unambiguous urn significantly 
affected their decision. Immediate emotions gained only very weak 
predictive power (Nagelkerke’s R²=.07). The difference between the 
subjective probabilities of winning with the ambiguous or the 
unambiguous urn played no crucial role for these participants.  
 On the contrary for those participants’ decision scoring high on 
this personality trait was mostly affected by emotions regarding both 
immediate options, and only very weakly by the emotional content 
connected to the anticipated scenario of losing with the ambiguous 
127 
urn. Anticipated emotional states only accounted for a very weak 
predictive power of Nagelkerke’s R² of .03, on the contrary immediate 
emotions with .31 and subjective probability with .35. 
 This eventually irritating result suggests that the measure of 
Personal Need for Structure captures the proneness to base the 
decision on the riskless perspective on choice: the decision to bet 
either on an ambiguous or on an unambiguous risk of participants 
with a high need for structure was strongly connected to the 
immediate emotions regarding the choice itself. These emotions serve 
as the close and reliable cue which directly structures the situation. 
In general, these results reveal that there are characteristics of 
personality which influence the way how emotions affect decisions. 
4.2.2. Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Effects of ambiguity-aversion seem to disappear when absolute 
secrecy of participant’s decision is guaranteed (Trautmann, Vieider, 
Wakker, 2008). It could be hypothesized that the individual 
disposition to imagine an “other” or the implicit idea of that one has 
to account for his/hers decision change decisions systematically 
under risk and uncertainty. Those with a high salience of a watching 
instance might be those who extensively search for good reasons or 
early in the decision-making process begin to rationalize their 
intuition to go for one or the other option. 
 This might also be an interesting approach to inquire the 
phenomenon of trust. Maybe the individual differences in the salience 
of the decision to trust being evaluated or even only watched by 
others lead to different behavior. One could hypothesize what role 
this impartial spectator then might play: one that serves as a proxy of 
following a value based or moral judgment or one that serves as the 
rational wise economic decider? It could be the case that those 
applying the value-bound nature of the spectator on average tend 
more to trust an anonymous person than those striving for laud from 
an impartial homo economicus. Furthermore, if the first role is the 
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one applied to the decision to trust, reactions to changes in 
probability of potential trustees acting trustworthy should not be as 
strong as they would be when the second role is applied. Hence, 
differences in this elasticity might show up in a specific individual 
manner. Cultural differences are to be expected here, too. 
4.3. Advances in Methods 
4.3.1. Physiological Measures 
To inquire the question deeper to what extent the measurements of 
the SAM are partly cognitively generated or biased answers, one 
possible way to go is to record immediate visceral affects by using 
physiological measures. Of course the SAM is an instrument which 
allows coming closer to spontaneous affective information but by far 
it is not perfect. Actually, up to now not much is known about how 
the answers people indicate on that matrix specifically deviate or go 
along with physiological measures (with exception of those mentioned 
before and Bradley and Lang, 2000). By giving specific stimuli it 
could be tested where islands of related but distinct emotions map 
and how they are bridged to other “emotional archipelagos” (or clouds 
of sense). In particular there might be found tipping points or other 
non-linear relations between dimensional changes on the stimuli and 
the answers on the SAM. This then could be taken as a hint how the 
response includes recombination, weighting and fitting of the three-
dimensional information. As a by-product this would serve as further 
validation of the SAM. 
 Practically one could imagine studying decision making 
problems in the framework of the risk-as-feelings theory like we did 
before, but additionally measuring Skin Conductance Response 
(SCR), Pupil diameter (PD), and Peripheral Arterial Tone (PAT) when 
asking for the immediate emotions connected to the decision problem 
itself and all possible outcomes. 
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4.3.2. Clustering 
Up to now little is known how much information is really lost when 
clustering individual emotional information to a larger group with 
averaged values on all three dimensions (valence, arousal, 
dominance). The cluster solutions found in the mentioned studies 
were always conducted with a 25% corridor of outlier-detection. This 
means that every individual combination deviating more than 25% of 
the averaged values on all three dimensions on any of the detected 
clusters was not used in the analysis. Due to the fact that these 
cases are rather rare (usually about 2%-5% of a sample) this did not 
spoil our results in a sense that we just used the participants fitting 
into a rather narrow emotional picture. And it might be a hint that a 
large majority perceives the detected and clustered emotional states 
quite uniformly. But of course this can not be assumed without 
deeper analysis. So on the one hand the clustering process shows its 
strength by reducing a massive stream of individual data but on the 
other hand of course this advantage is bought by loss of information. 
 But it should not be forgotten that this clustering also serves as 
an attempt to follow the theoretical idea that every emotion finds is 
distinctive place in the three dimensional space of valence, 
dominance and arousal. 
4.4. Applying the Framework of Immediate and 
Anticipated Emotions 
The approach of asking for the influence of emotions could be used to 
inquire the emotional nature of a series of well known phenomenons. 
4.4.1. Manipulating immediate emotions. 
Status-Quo effect. It is a well known finding that people tend stay 
with the default option of the situation (status-quo effect). Similar it 
is known that people tend to evaluate the value of a good higher when 
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they own it compared to the case when they want to have it 
(endowment effect; Kahnemann, Knetsch, Thaler, 1991). 
 It can be hypothesized that such effects occur due to emotions 
affecting the decision. For this reason we will conduct an experiment 
where participants obtain either an amount of $5 or a voucher for a 
lottery. Participants are allowed to change their endowment: those 
who received the $5 can use this money to buy them into a lottery 
where they get a 50% chance to win $10 (a coin flip). Losing in this 
lottery has the consequence to leave without any money. Those who 
received the voucher for the same lottery are allowed not to use it and 
instead change it into save $5. 
 We then will ask the participants to indicate their immediate 
emotions for either keeping or exchanging the endowment they 
received as well as for the anticipated emotions attached to all 
possible outcomes (taking the sure option and win, taking the sure 
option and lose, taking the lottery and win, taking the lottery and 
lose). 
 Depending on the kind of endowment the participants received 
in both experimental conditions (lottery voucher, save $5) most 
possible different rates of exchanging the endowment will occur. We 
hypothesize that these differences are mostly driven by the immediate 
emotions, not by those anticipated and only moderately by the 
subjective probability to win in the lottery. 
 Inter-Temporal Choice. It is a well known fact that people’s 
wish to either accelerate or delay the realization of gains or losses 
heavily varies with the height of stakes and the point in time these 
events might occur (Loewenstein and Thaler, 1989). Such ‘anomalies’ 
might be also explainable by differences in the emotional content 
attached to the future outcomes and the emotions perceived for the 
immediate realization. This might explain such interesting patterns 
that teachers choose to delay their salary from 9 to 12 month 
(delayed reward) or the proneness to realize bad events now and not 
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pay much to avoid an electric shock now but much for avoiding it in 
the farer future. To find out about the role of emotions in this 
context, varying the emotional content is manipulated trough varying 
the time of realization and content of events (gains, losses, now, 
future, etc.). 
 The effect of cute pandas. One could think about directly 
manipulate the emotional content of the alternatives of a decision 
and observe how the perception of this content affects choice. An 
experiment could ask one group of participants to choose between a 
50€ lottery and helping 1 or 2 pandas. Another group could be asked 
for choosing between a 50€ lottery and a 25% or 50% rebate on the 
next textbook they buy. If results would show that this manipulation 
of the emotions connected to the decision works in a sense that 
difference occurs regarding how often the lottery is chosen, the 
impact of immediate emotions on the decision would be confirmed 
further. 
 Misattribution. Further confirmation for the effects of 
immediate emotions could be shown when actively changing the 
emotional state in the moment the actual decision is going on would 
influence the decision. One could imagine to set participants under 
the impact of a fake “magnetic-field brain-distortion apparatus” and 
tell them that they will feel somehow (e.g., strange or nervous or 
fearful or aroused or emotionless or emotional). Then they would 
have to make simple risky decisions. In this way immediate emotions 
would be manipulated trough misattribution. An analysis would 
focus on the effects on the immediate emotions attached to the 
options as well as those attached to outcomes and to behavior. The 
problem of this approach is that immediate emotions connected to 
both alternatives would be manipulated, and not just to one 
alternative. 
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4.5. Preferences 
It might be worth to think about the allowance of emotions in 
economic decision models, especially in the context of the relation of 
short to long term preferences. If one allows for endogenous 
preferences – meaning the environment constantly changing 
preferences – it is hard to conclude why this should just be true for 
the short term ones. A lifetime utility optimum is reached only if one 
assumes a well-informed actor that in the long run will move on an 
optimal path which gains higher personal welfare. Assuming short 
term preferences would result in erratic not-equilibrium realizations. 
 Our approach gives evidence for the impact of short term 
preferences by showing that in a lot and especially in (economic) risky 
choices immediate emotions do play a crucial role. Given this finding, 
it is to question how actors then should find their optimal long term 
utility path when their reasoning is pliable? Addiction behavior may 
serve as an extreme example, but this might also be true for 
economic behavior: Trusting your banking expert too much might 
lead to systematic over-investment in the market, your wish for being 
a proud house owner may let you forget about the real value and risk 
of such a good, etc. This idea then allows for declining paths by 
explaining non-rational, meaning non-consequentialistic choices. 
 On a broader level it might be to ask to what extend markets 
exist and function because of actors behaving imperfect compared to 
the homo economicus. Especially in these days of global crisis it is 
unfolded how crucial and essential the institution of trust is. And 
interestingly enough, it really seems to be a difficult task to 
reestablish trust because it seems to be quite independent of the 
amount of money pumped into the market. Maybe the reason for that 
phenomenon can simply be found in the fact that trust follows 
different rules as investment decisions. Or it reveals how often 
common investment decisions are decisions to trust. 
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 Given the deciding role of emotions in risky decisions shown in 
this work, future economic decision-making approaches may draw 
attention to a fact which was already mentioned long time ago by 
Blaise Pascal. 
 
The heart has its reasons,  
which reason does not know. 
 
(Blaise Pascal, 1660) 
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